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∗

ABSTRACT
This Article develops an analytic framework for
understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design. It
begins by differentiating between three types of uncertainty:
legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and uncertainty about the
application of law to fact. This framework highlights the
pervasiveness of factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty in
daily affairs. Viewed through this framework, legal uncertainty
is less problematic than it is typically thought to be.
The Article then focuses on legal uncertainty, examining it
from two perspectives: the relationship between rules and
standards, and the relationship between simplicity and
complexity. It suggests that there are fundamental limits on the
amount of certainty in any regulatory system. These include
limits of internal consistency, limits created by the pressure for
justice in the individual case, and limits created by the tendency
of additional complexity—past a certain point—to decrease,
rather than increase, the certainty of legal requirements.
Before concluding, the Article sets out four propositions
about the relationship between legal uncertainty and regulatory
design. First, pockets of legal uncertainty are often a desirable
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characteristic of regulatory systems. Second, in any particular
regulatory field, large swings over time between high levels of
certainty and uncertainty are likely to be less desirable than a
consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty. Third, arguments
for legal certainty are rarely distributionally neutral and are
often window dressing for what are fundamentally distributional
arguments. Fourth, uncertainty about the content of future legal
requirements is qualitatively different from uncertainty about
the application of existing legal requirements. It is beyond the
scope of this Article to explore these propositions in detail.
However, the ability to identify them suggests the value of
having a solid analytic framework for understanding the role of
uncertainty in regulatory design.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article explores the relationship between legal
uncertainty1 and regulatory design. It takes a broad
perspective on regulation,2 using the term to include any
combination of a monitoring regime and a system of sanctions
or benefits for particular behaviors.3 Its focus is on the

1.
This Article uses the unmodified term “uncertainty” in a general sense intended
to capture the group of ideas referred to in various literature by terms such as:
“ambiguity,” “indeterminacy,” “vagueness,” “Knightian Risk and Uncertainty” (without
distinguishing between the two Knightian Categories), and “fat-tailed risk.” It uses the
more specific terms individually when intending to refer to them in their precise,
technical sense.
The decision to use the term “uncertainty” to refer these concepts collectively is
in no way intended to suggest these terms are equivalent. All have some distinct
meanings, and the divisions are particularly sharp in certain academic fields. For
example, economists often focus on Frank Knight’s distinction between “risk” (where
probabilities can be quantified) and “uncertainty” (where probabilities cannot be
quantified). See generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (photo.
reprint 1964) (1921). The Article uses the single term “uncertainty” to refer collectively to
these ideas for two reasons. First, the use of a single term keeps sentence structures
manageable. Second, this collective use of the term is sufficiently close to lay usage of
“uncertainty” that it should make sense to readers from different academic fields. See
Uncertainty, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/210212 (last
visited Apr. 22, 2016).
2.
To be clear, I am not offering a precise definition of “regulation” here. I am
setting out a perspective on regulation meant to include a large number of different
systems for controlling behavior. The exact boundaries between regulation and its
absence are not important to this project.
3.
This perspective is meant to include regulation targeting either behaviors or
outcomes, and involving either government or third-party monitoring. I discuss these
approaches to regulation in more detail in Adam I. Muchmore, Private Regulation and
Foreign Conduct, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 371, 377–81 (2010). A non-exhaustive list of topics
included in this perspective on regulation are traditional command-and-control
regulation, delegations of regulatory authority to public and private entities,
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practical role that legal uncertainty plays in regulatory
systems. This practical focus puts the emphasis on
understanding the effect legal uncertainty has on primary
behavior—the actions that subjects of regulation take before
they know whether they will be involved in a particular,
concrete dispute.4
A prominent view in the opinions issued by courts,5 the
extrajudicial writing of prominent jurists,6 the work of leading

outcome-based regulation, and tort law. Id. at 382–85. In other words, “regulation” in this
Article does not refer solely (or even primarily) to formal and informal rulemaking by
executive agencies.
4.
This focus on primary behavior deemphasizes the role of judicial decisions in
actual, litigated disputes. This is important because actual, litigated disputes may be
highly unrepresentative of the broader range of legal disputes. See generally George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1984); see also Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 493, 495, 498–501 (1996) (challenging a separate aspect of the
Priest-Klein model, but praising its “general and original conclusion that cases that go to
trial are unrepresentative of settled cases”). This Article emphasizes instead the way
primary actors can be expected to respond—often outside of court—to situations in which
the law is uncertain.
5.
See, e.g., Comm’r v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (“[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001) (“That line . . . [for permitted surveillance of a home] must be not only firm but also
bright—which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that require a
warrant.”); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 323–24 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (observing that when the Court follows bad precedents as a matter of stare
decisis “[c]onsistency and stability may be so served” and those things are “desirable in
themselves, for only thereby can the law be predictable to those who must shape their
conduct by it and to lower courts which must apply it”); Roessler v. Novak, 858 So. 2d
1158, 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (Altenbrand, C.J., concurring) (“The uncertainty of
the current system, however, does not work.”).
6.
See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE
NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 5–6 (1962) (criticizing “the failure to
develop standards sufficiently definite to permit decisions to be fairly predictable and the
reasons for them to be understood”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 18–20, 414 (2012) (asserting that proper judicial
use of textualism would mean that “over time the law will be more certain, and the rule of
law will then be more secure”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV.
635, 644 (1989) (“Legal uncertainty is the godfather of discovery abuse. Uncertainty
comes not only from nebulous rules in traditional subjects such as torts and contracts but
also from attempting to handle in the courts, problems amenable to no simple solution.”);
Antonin Scalia, The Rules of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(“Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, ‘reckonability,’ is a needful characteristic of any
law worthy of the name. There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at
all.” (internal footnote omitted)); Bryan A. Garner, How Nuanced Is Justice Scalia’s
Judicial
Philosophy?
An
Exchange,
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Sept.
9,
2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/107001/how-nuanced-justice-scalias-judicial-philosophy
-exchange (“What motivated Justice Scalia and me to write this ambitious book was our
desire to bring clarity to what has become the most muddled aspect of judicial
decision-making: interpretation.”).
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law-reform organizations,7 the business press,8 the academic
world,9 and political debate10 is that legal uncertainty is a

7.
Two of the best known law reform organizations are the American Law Institute
(ALI) and the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). The ALI’s certificate of incorporation
states that one of the organization’s primary goals is to “promote the clarification and
simplification of the law.” Am. Law Inst., Certificate of Incorporation (Feb. 23, 1923),
reprinted in 81 A.L.I. PROC. 501, 501 (2004), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public
/10/62/106284da-ddfe-4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/certificate-of-incorporation.pdf. Likely the
best-known work of the ULC is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The UCC states
that its “purposes and policies” include “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law
governing commercial transactions.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2013).
8.
See, e.g., The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at
22, http://www.economist.com/node/21547784 (criticizing numerous aspects of the
Dodd-Frank Act and its implementation, including discretion granted to regulators by
complex—but still vague—statutory provisions); Jamie Whyte, Opinion, David Cameron
vs. The Rule of Law: The Prime Minister’s Energy-Price Activism Will Lead to More Crony
Capitalism, WALL ST. J. (Eur.) (Oct. 28, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052970203897404578076762840352532
(using
a
regulatory
intervention on energy pricing to argue generally against government interventions in the
economy that erode certainty in “the rules of the game”).
9.
See, e.g., GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 291
(1986) (“In Bentham’s view, the greatest virtue of a rule of law (at least with respect to its
form) is that it be public, determinate, and as a result certain and predictable in its
application. Only under these conditions, so the argument goes, can it be said to be
binding, because only under these conditions could it effectively guide action.”); Martha A.
Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 684
(1981) (“In many cases, . . . federal jurisdictional rules are extraordinarily unclear. They
are also extremely complex. And it is not obvious what policy the complexities fulfill.”);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 171 (2015)
(arguing in favor of legal requirements structured as “catalogs” on the ground that these
“do better than standards at creating a zone of certainty for actors at much lower cost
than fully specified rules”); H.W.R. Wade, The Concept of Legal Certainty: A Preliminary
Skirmish, 4 MOD. L. REV. 183, 189 (1941) (“As law exists for security, confidence and
freedom, it must be invested with as much certainty and uniformity as can be provided by
the wavering structures of human institutions.”).
For much of his career, Friedrich von Hayek was a forceful proponent of clear,
certain rules promulgated in advance and applied strictly. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960) (arguing that rule by “laws and not men” requires
that “the judge who applies [laws] has no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow
from the existing body of rules and the particular facts of the case”); F.A. HAYEK, THE
ROAD TO SERFDOM 81 (Routledge Classics 2006) (1944) (criticizing the use of “vague
formula[s]” such as “reference to what is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’” in legal requirements, and
suggesting that their use, and “the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty” associated
with their use, could be a framework for “writ[ing] a history of the decline of the Rule of
Law”). Hayek later backed away from the position that strict application of clear rules
was the best way to achieve legal certainty, but continued to see legal certainty as a core
goal. See F.A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 116
(Routledge 1998) (1973) [hereinafter HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY] (“It seems
to me that judicial decisions may in fact be more predictable if the judge is also bound by
generally held views of what is just, even when they are not supported by the letter of the
law, than when he is restricted to deriving his decisions only from those among accepted
beliefs which have found expression in the written law.”).
A focus on certainty and predictability is particularly common among those who
write in the field of Conflict of Laws. This can be true even among those who propose

(4) Muchmore_Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

1326

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

5/22/16 7:22 PM

[53:5

characteristic of poorly designed regulatory systems.11 Many
lobbying efforts target legal uncertainty, and numerous academic
writings propose reforms designed to reduce or eliminate
uncertainty from particular areas of law.12
This Article contributes to a growing literature challenging
that view.13 This Article makes three primary contributions.
approaches that make the ultimate choice of law decision depend heavily on the forum in
which the case is filed. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177–87 (1963).
10.
See, e.g., JAN EBERLY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, IS REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY A
MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO JOB GROWTH? (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center
/economic-policy/Documents/Is%20Regulatory%20Uncertainty%20a%20Major%20Impedi
ment%20to%20Job%20Growth_20111121_vFINAL.pdf
(“[A]
commonly
repeated
misconception[] [is] that uncertainty created by proposed regulations is holding back
business investment in [job growth] . . . .”).
11.
I use regulatory systems in a broad sense here, not one limited to agency
rulemaking. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. Accordingly, statutes, treaties,
regulations, guidance documents, and precedent (judicial and administrative) are all
parts of regulatory systems.
12.
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 216 (1969) (“We must . . . find ways to minimize discretionary injustice.”);
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881) (“Legal, like natural
divisions, however clear in their general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in
a penumbra or debatable land. . . . Still, the tendency of the law must always be to narrow
the field of uncertainty.”); Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A
Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 793–94 (2013) (defending their approach to
foreign affairs federalism on the grounds that “it has the potential to lend structure,
predictability, and analytic rigor to an area of jurisprudence that to date has been erratic,
unpredictable, and unprincipled”); Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1109 (2011) (“The current, piecemeal approach to
the field has produced a rambling labyrinth of analytical bloat. The law is complex
without subtlety, knotted without development, and often blunt without judgment.”);
Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed
Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 465 (1998) (“This
Article . . . provides a single, comprehensive ‘Unitary Framework’ for analyzing the
Supreme Court’s dormant-commerce-clause jurisprudence, making it at once more cogent
and accessible.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
798 (2001) (supporting argument for purposive interpretation of First Amendment in
significant part by showing that “purposivism yields determinate results for three
controversial First Amendment issues”). On Holmes’s complicated views on uncertainty,
compare O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897) (“And the
logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every
human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.”),
with Robert L. Rabin, The Pervasive Role of Uncertainty in Tort Law: Rights and
Remedies, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 432 (2011) (noting Holmes’s “long-held preoccupation
with narrowing the range of uncertainty in tort cases”), and Wade, supra note 9, at 192–
94 (suggesting that Jerome Frank, in Law and the Modern Mind, overemphasized
Holmes’s skeptical-of-certainty aphorisms and arguing that Holmes would “[s]urely not”
have “condemned the lawyer’s innate hunger for an ordered and certain jurisprudence”).
13.
See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 61–62
(2012) (arguing that the value of legal certainty is often overstated in legal arguments
and common-law decision-making); Diane Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty
Imperative in Corporate Finance Jurisprudence, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1461, 1482–84
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First, it presents a framework for analyzing the relationship
between three types of uncertainty relevant to legal
decision-making: legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and
law-fact uncertainty. Although others have addressed these types
of uncertainty individually (and occasionally in pairs),14 this
Article is the first systematic presentation of the relationship
between these types of uncertainty and regulatory design. It is
also the first systematically to consider the relationship between
these types of uncertainty and the time at which a decision is
made.
Second, this Article suggests that there are fundamental
limits to how much legal certainty can be achieved. These limits
apply both to legal systems generally and to specific areas within
a legal system. The analysis approaches legal requirements from
the familiar perspective of distinguishing between rules and
standards. It then considers the degree to which making a
requirement either more rule-like or more complex can increase
legal certainty. It argues that there are fundamental limits to
how much either option can increase legal certainty. (The Article
does not seek to measure these limits; it seeks only to establish
that they exist.)

(criticizing the tendency of courts to favor rules rather than standards in corporate
finance case law); Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV.
1, 3 (2011) (arguing that simplicity and clarity in the rules of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction is an unattainable goal); Timothy Endicott, Law Is Necessarily Vague, 7
LEGAL THEORY 379, 379 (2001) (arguing that law is necessarily vague—and that this is a
good thing); Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2011, at 133 (arguing that legal uncertainty is desirable when
lawmakers wish to reduce the degree to which legal rules affect ex ante decision-making);
Ofer Raban, The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better
for Capitalism and Liberalism, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 175, 175–76 (2010) (arguing that
standards are often superior to rules in allowing people to predict the consequences of
their actions in the manner necessary for capitalism and liberalism); see also Julian J. Z.
Polaris, Note, Backstop Ambiguity: A Proposal for Balancing Specificity and Ambiguity in
Financial Regulation, 33 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 233–34 (2014) (suggesting that the
SEC should, in its regulation of financial wrongdoing, rely on a combination of bright-line
rules and a “backstop” of ambiguous standards to “discourage[] attempts to exploit
loopholes in bright-line rules”). For an earlier paper calling for additional academic focus
on “the subject of how much detail we should have in the law,” see Gordon Tullock, On the
Desirable Degree of Detail in the Law, 2 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 199, 199 (1995). For an
argument against an exaggerated focus on certainty in constitutional theory, see DANIEL
A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). For a much broader argument against
the use of detailed rules in government decision-making (including a proposal for five
constitutional amendments to make this possible), see PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF
NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT (2014). This
literature is discussed below infra Part III.A.
14.
See infra Part III.B (discussing observations by Jerome Frank and H.L.A. Hart
on the connection between legal and factual uncertainty).
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Third, the Article sets out four tentative propositions about
the relationship between uncertainty and regulatory design.
First, pockets of legal uncertainty may at times increase, rather
than decrease, the overall level of legal certainty in a particular
regulatory system or legal field.15 Second, in any particular
regulatory field, large swings over time between high levels of
certainty and uncertainty are less desirable than a consistently
moderate level of legal uncertainty. Third, arguments over legal
certainty are rarely distributionally neutral and are often
window dressing for fundamentally distributional arguments.
Fourth, uncertainty about the content of future legal
requirements is qualitatively different from uncertainty about
the application of existing legal requirements.
Following this Introduction, Part II provides background
information on the three types of uncertainty addressed in this
Article, the jurisprudential concepts of “rules” and “standards,”
and the simplicity and complexity of legal requirements. Part III
addresses the three types of uncertainty in more detail and
describes factors relevant to the role each plays in regulatory
design. Part IV focuses on legal uncertainty and suggests that
there are fundamental limits on the amount of certainty in any
legal requirement or set of legal requirements. These
fundamental limits fall into two categories: limits on the amount
of legal certainty that can be achieved by making a requirement
more rule-like, and limits on the amount of legal certainty that
can be achieved by making a requirement more complex. Part V
sets out four propositions about the choice between certainty and
uncertainty in regulatory design. It suggests overall that legal
uncertainty is unavoidable in functioning regulatory systems, but
that the amount of legal uncertainty is not constant and that all
types of legal uncertainty are not equally good or bad. Careful
regulatory design should seek not to minimize legal uncertainty,
but to choose a level and type of legal uncertainty that will best
serve the overall goals of the relevant regulatory system. Part VI
concludes with a short summary of the Article’s core claims.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part introduces concepts that will be discussed
throughout the Article. The first is the three types of uncertainty
relevant to legal decision-making: legal uncertainty, factual

15.
A similar position is expressed in some of the rules-standards, jurisprudence,
and codification literature. See infra Part III.A This Article integrates this insight into a
larger framework for understanding the role of uncertainty in regulatory design.
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uncertainty, and law-fact uncertainty. The second is the idea that
legal requirements can be broadly categorized as ranging from
“rules” to “standards.” The third addresses the characteristics
that can make a legal requirement “simple” or “complex.”
A. Types of Uncertainty
The focus of this Article is on the role of legal uncertainty in
regulation. But legal uncertainty does not exist in isolation.
Factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty exist as well, and
both play a major role in the decision-making of primary actors.16
And understanding both is necessary to understand legal
uncertainty.
Legal uncertainty is uncertainty about the content of the
law. It is the primary focus of this Article. Factual uncertainty is
uncertainty about facts in the world. It may well dwarf legal
uncertainty in the calculations of primary actors. Law-fact
uncertainty is uncertainty not about the content of the law itself
or the facts that exist in the world. It is, instead, uncertainty
about how a decision-maker—a judge, jury, or agency—will apply
law to fact.17
The presence of these three types of uncertainty—legal,
factual, and law-fact—highlights the relatively limited role legal
16.
The claim here is that dividing uncertainty into these three categories provides
a useful way of thinking about the relationship between various types of uncertainty in
regulatory systems. They are not intended as sharp divisions, and this Article does not
make a metaphysical claim that each one somehow “exists” out there in the world
independently of the others. Instead, the claim is simply that looking at these three types
of uncertainty gives us a better way of thinking about regulatory design than we have if
we treat the three together as a single idea.
Other, related divisions are of course possible. For example, from a formalist,
natural law, or philosophical perspective it might be possible to focus on the distinction
between the metaphysical question of whether law itself has a fixed, certain content and
the epistemic question of whether particular decision-makers are able to determine the
content of the law on any particular issue. These could be presented as two separate
categories of legal uncertainty. From a strictly path-of-the-law Holmesian perspective or
an extreme-legal-realist perspective, it might be possible to combine legal and factual
uncertainty on the basis that what courts will do in the future (and, accordingly, what the
law is) is simply a question of fact. From yet another perspective, it might be possible to
focus on the role that the attitudes or ideologies of regulated parties and regulatory
designers play in shaping the certainty of a legal requirement.
However, each of these possibilities go beyond the scope of this Article. The
contention here is not that legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and law-fact
uncertainty are the only types of uncertainty relevant to regulatory design. It is simply
that this tripartite breakdown illuminates some issues that are otherwise obscure and
accordingly helps us think more clearly about the role of legal uncertainty in regulatory
design.
17.
Cf. Russell Pannier, D’Amato, Kripke, and Legal Indeterminacy, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 881, 883 (2000) (noting distinction between claims that “mixed law and
fact” decisions are indeterminate and that “legal rules” themselves are indeterminate).
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uncertainty plays in the full range of uncertainties faced by
primary actors. Factual uncertainty cannot be eliminated in
regulation; it is an inherent element of the human experience.
Law-fact uncertainty can be increased or decreased to some
degree, but is likely to remain an important element in most
real-world regulatory programs.18 Given these important sources
of uncertainty, legal uncertainty may not be as disabling to
primary actors as many standard discussions suggest.19
B. Rules and Standards
It is broadly accepted that legal requirements exist on a
continuum from pure “rules” to pure “standards.” A large
literature attests to the value of the rule-standard distinction in
the analysis of a wide range of legal fields.20 This literature can
be roughly divided into three groups. The first is those works
explicitly using the terms “rule” and “standard” to describe a
largely consistent set of ideas.21 These works tend to build on

18.
Consider, for example, whether it is likely that we will reach a point where the
selection of decision-makers—an individual judge, jury, or agency official—is not
perceived as potentially influencing the outcome of borderline cases. The importance of
the decision-maker’s identity is discussed further infra Part III.C.
19.
These three types of uncertainty are discussed in more detail infra Part III.
20.
See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953,
1024–26 & nn.284–323 app. (1995) (illustrating the rule-standard distinction in a wide
range of legal fields).
21.
See generally P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY,
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1987); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 138–41 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15–63 (1987); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES
(Frederick Schauer ed., 2011) (posthumously published manuscript); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42–61 (1990); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN
LIFE (1991); Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the
Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982) (using the rule-standard
framework to analyze the Uniform Commercial Code’s approach to the battle-of-forms in
sales law); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493 (2008) (using the rule-standard
framework to conduct an empirical analysis of case law under the Voting Rights Act);
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 49 (2007); Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983) (examining the appropriate level of precision in agency rulemaking,
through a case study of agency-promulgated legal requirements governing airline-pilot
retirement, national-bank chartering, determining eligibility for social security disability
payments, and granting permanent residence to aliens); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (using
the rule-standard framework to conduct an economic analysis of the level of “precision or
specificity” of legal requirements); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
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each other and display an awareness that they are dealing with a
set of concepts that can be applied in multiple legal fields. The
second encompasses those works (often, but not always, older)
that discuss the same ideas as the rule-standard literature but
without using that terminology.22 A third uses the ideas of rules
and standards as a starting point, then goes on to argue for the
current or future existence of new legal forms that do not exist on
the rule-standard continuum.23
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (positing that the difference between rules and
standards rests entirely on the difference between ex post and ex ante application of law,
and presenting economic analysis of when each is desirable from the perspective of overall
social welfare); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (using the rule-standard framework to examine the
relationship between individualism and altruism in private law); Adam I. Muchmore,
Jurisdictional Standards (and Rules), 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 171 (2013) (using the
rule-standard framework to examine extraterritorial regulation by the United States);
Rabin, supra note 12 (discussing the development of rules and standards in tort law);
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988) (using the
rule-standard framework to examine the law of property); Scalia, supra note 6 (surveying
the rules applicable to statutory interpretation); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (using the rule-standard framework to examine the general
structure of legal arguments); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992)
(using the rule-standard framework to examine the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 term);
Sunstein, supra note 20 (examining arguments for and against structuring legal
requirements as rules); Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 58 (Andrei Marmor & Scott
Soames eds., 2011) (using the rule-standard framework to discuss the degree to which
legal requirements can guide action).
22.
For literature discussing the rule-standard concept but with different
terminology, see, for example, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 166 (1921); JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 141–56 (1927); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
COMPLEX WORLD 37–38 (1995) (exploring the trade-off between “simple rules” and “justice
in the individual case”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 130–32 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing open-textured legal requirements); HOLMES, supra note 12, at 111–29;
HOWARD, supra note 13; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 946 (1987) (discussing the role of standard-like balancing
tests in constitutional law, without explicitly emphasizing the rule-standard distinction);
Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1960) (arguing for an
absolutist interpretation of the Bill of Rights).
For the classic rule-standard disputes between Justice Black (rules) and Justice
Frankfurter (standards), compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
588–89 (1952) (Black, J.), and Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70–75 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and
Adamson, 332 U.S. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For other famous cases pitting
rules against standards, see, for example, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275
U.S. 66 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (choosing a rule for railroad-crossing cases); Pokora v. Wabash
Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (limiting Goodman and instead choosing a
standard for railroad-crossing cases).
23.
There are currently at least two papers in this third category. The first, an
article by Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, argues for recognition of what they see as
an existing-but-not-yet-recognized legal form, the “catalog.” Parchomovsky & Stein, supra
note 9, at 168 (“A catalog, as it is defined in this Essay, consists of an outright ban on a
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Legal requirements structured as rules specify outcomes ex
ante—before the relevant transaction or event occurs.24 Pure

detailed, but incomplete, list of specific activities and a general prohibition of all activities
falling into the same category. Accordingly, a typical catalog would contain a specific
enumeration of proscribed conduct and a general provision empowering courts to penalize
or enjoin other similar activities.”). They believe the catalog “integrate[s] the advantages
of rules and standards while minimizing their shortcomings.” Id. at 181.
The second, a working paper by Tony Casey and Anthony Niblett, argues that
upcoming advances in predictive and communication technology will make both rules and
standards obsolete. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 550, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826. They believe that rules, standards, and everything in
between will be replaced by a new form of law that they call the “micro-directive.” Id.
(suggesting that legislative goals will be “translated by machines into a vast catalog of
simple commands for all possible scenarios,” such that “[w]hen an individual citizen faces
a legal choice, the machine will select from the catalog and communicate to that
individual the precise context-specific command (the micro-directive) necessary for
compliance”). Casey and Niblett believe that the micro-directive will “provide all of the
benefits of both rules and standards without the costs of either.” Id. at 2.
A detailed discussion of the Parchomovsky-Stein and Casey-Niblett papers is
beyond the scope of this Article. Overall, this Article parts from the Parchomovsky/Stein
and Casey/Niblett positions on the question of whether “rule” and “standard” are two
ultimate endpoints on a continuum of possible legal forms. This Article takes the position
that they are ultimate endpoints, and that any legal requirement is necessarily rule,
standard, or some point between the two. See infra Part IV. From this perspective, both
catalogs and micro-directives are simply legal requirements that fall somewhere in
between the “pure rule” and “pure standard” ends of the rule-standard continuum.
Nonetheless, both the catalog and the micro-directive are concepts that give us a
useful shorthand for describing an important set of characteristics found in existing
(catalogs) or possible future (micro-directive) legal requirements. In this, catalogs and
micro-directives can be added to the helpful typology of legal requirements set out by Cass
Sunstein. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 959–68 (identifying “untrammeled discretion,”
“rules,” “rules with excuses,” “presumptions,” “factors,” “standards,” “guidelines,”
“principles,” and “analogies”).
The Casey-Niblett paper is still a working draft, but two further comments on
its broad themes are necessary. First, a strong claim can be made that predictive
technology will lead to major changes in where rules and standards exist in a legal
system, and that this technology may reduce some of the costs associated with highly
detailed laws. But even if lawmakers do delegate substantial law-making authority to
computers, they still have to make a delegation—and that delegation itself can be
structured as a rule, standard, or something in between.
Second, it seems unlikely that predictive and communication technology will
eliminate judges and legal disputes. Even if computers do implement laws through highly
detailed instructions to regulated parties, these are likely to be default rules rather than
mandatory rules (at least outside of a totalitarian society). Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99
YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing the relationship between default rules and mandatory
rules in contract law). There will often be room to litigate whether a given
computer-generated rule should have been followed in a particular case. Detailed,
computer-generated compliance directives will likely affect which disputes are litigated,
which are settled, and on what terms particular disputes are settled. They may also
increase the degree to which settlement terms mirror the likely outcome of a formally
litigated dispute. But it is difficult to imagine a situation where computer-generated
compliance directives largely eliminate lawsuits as we know them.
24.
See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60.

(4) Muchmore_Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

2016]

UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY

5/22/16 7:22 PM

1333

rules do this by directing the decision-maker to consider only
specific facts and to apply those facts mechanically to reach a
predetermined outcome. Classic examples of rule-like
requirements are a speed limit of 55 miles per hour and the U.S.
Constitution’s requirement that the President must be at least
thirty-five years old.25
Legal requirements structured as standards specify
outcomes ex post—after the relevant transaction or event
occurs.26 Pure standards do this by directing the decision-maker
to consider the totality of the circumstances relevant to the case.
Classic examples of standard-like requirements include laws
requiring driving at a “reasonable speed,” laws prohibiting
“unconscionable”
contracts,27
the
Fourth
Amendment’s
prohibition on “unreasonable searches and seizures,”28 and the
various balancing tests that exist throughout the law.29
Rules and standards are themselves ideal types; real-world
legal requirements exist on a continuum between the two.30
Whether a requirement is closer to a rule or a standard depends
in part on its linguistic structure and in part on the
jurisprudence that has come to be associated with the
requirement. For example, the First Amendment is phrased in a
highly rule-like manner, providing that “Congress shall make no
law” infringing various rights.31 However, case law interpreting
the First Amendment generally requires courts to make ex post
determinations by balancing First Amendment interests against
25.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60.
26.
See Kaplow, supra note 21, at 559–60.
27.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
28.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
29.
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). For other examples
in constitutional law, see Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 963–72 (describing the growth of
balancing in constitutional law).
30.
On treating rules and standards as a continuum, see, for example, Bayern,
supra note 13, at 59; Russell Korobkin, A “Traditional” and “Behavioral”
Law-and-Economics Analysis of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U.
HAW. L. REV. 441, 444 (2004); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25–30 (2000); Muchmore, supra note 21,
at 180.
31.
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”). An alternative interpretation suggested to me
by a colleague is that the Amendment is in fact phrased as a standard because all of the
objects of “make no law” are abstract concepts requiring interpretation at the point of
application. I am not in a position to evaluate this from a historical perspective,
but—given the Amendment’s original scope (applying only to the federal government)—I
am inclined to the view that its structure and phrasing suggest a rule rather than a
standard.
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other constitutional values.32 Sometimes these interpretations
stay consistent, and sometimes they shift over time. Several
commentators have even suggested that courts cycle between
rule-like and standard-like interpretations of particular legal
requirements.33
C. Simplicity and Complexity
The concepts of legal simplicity and legal complexity defy
single, simple explanations.34 Complexity is tied at least in part
to the content of substantive law. Some areas of law are more
32.
See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014) (describing the “careful
balance” involved in determining the Free Speech rights of a public employee); see also
Aleinikoff, supra note 22, at 966–68 (describing the rise of balancing in First Amendment
cases).
33.
See, e.g., HART, supra note 22, at 130–31; Crane, supra note 21, at 59–61; Rose,
supra note 21, at 595–97.
34.
On the difficulty of defining simplicity and complexity, see BORIS I. BITTKER,
Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1974) (“Neither ‘tax
simplification’ nor its mirror image, complexity, is a concept that can be easily defined or
measured.”). On the idea of simplicity, see generally Alan Baker, Simplicity, in THE
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Fall 2013 ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/simplicity/. For a sampling of writing on
simplicity and complexity in law, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 22; CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); Dodson, supra note 13; Werner
Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1233 (1974)
(suggesting that efforts to increase legal certainty can result in increases in legal
complexity that can approach or exceed the social benefits of the relevant increase in
certainty); Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 150 (1995) (presenting formal mathematical analysis of the effects of legal
complexity on compliance with legal requirements under different enforcement regimes);
Daniel Martin Katz & M. J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Complexity of the Law: the
United States Code, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 337 (2014) (presenting a
quantitative analysis of the complexity of different titles of the United States Code); John
A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the
Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993) (examining the effects of complexity on the
degree of certainty in tax law); Lumen N. Mulligan, Clear Rules—Not Necessarily Simple
or Accessible Ones, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 13 (2011) (responding to Dodson, supra note
13); J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz, Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal
Complexity, 101 IOWA L. REV. 191 (2015) (proposing the application of empirical
complexity science to law, in particular by developing a computerized “Legal Maps”
application that would provide a layered map of the legal system roughly analogous to
existing, geographically-focused applications such as “Google Maps”); Peter H. Schuck,
Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992)
(analyzing legal complexity generally); Dru Stevenson, Costs of Codification, 2014 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1129 (suggesting that codification of statutes, a technique intended to simplify
law, lowers the transaction costs legislatures face in enacting detailed legal
requirements—and accordingly results in a more complex legal system); Tullock, supra
note 13, at 202–05 (discussing incentive structures leading to complex legal requirements
and calling for additional research on the appropriate level of precision in law); R. George
Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less
Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000) (examining different types of complexity in law
and suggesting that a legal change reducing complexity in one area also typically results
in an offsetting increase in legal complexity in one or more other areas).
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complex than others, and certain substantive policy choices
cannot be implemented without a significant level of
complexity.35 Both complex language and simple language can be
a source of complexity.36 A legal requirement can be complex in
itself or complex because it is difficult to describe.37
Legal requirements tend to be more complex the more
conduct they seek to regulate;38 the more technical expertise they
require to understand;39 the greater the compliance costs they
involve;40 the more difficult they are to contract around;41 the
more total components they involve;42 the more variety there is in
the types of components they involve;43 the more difficult they
are to apply for those who understand them in theory;44 the more
potential enforcers (and the variety of potential enforcers) they
involve;45 the more they involve choices between competing
values;46 the more that compliance with them involves simple,
intuitive responses rather than deliberative and reflective
thinking;47 and the more they involve consequences for third
parties48 (and the greater the magnitude of those consequences,
and the distances in location, relationship, or time at which they
can be felt).
In other words, complexity is itself a complex concept. This
Article emphasizes those aspects of complexity most directly tied
to the structure of the legal requirement itself. Accordingly, this
Article treats legal complexity as a function of the number,
35.
See Bittker, supra note 34, at 1–2 (noting that, because of the wide variety of
circumstances it must address, “[i]ncome taxation entails a high level of irreducible
complexity).
36.
EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 28; Bittker, supra note 34, at 2. On the possibility
that even a simple rule, such as “no vehicles in the park,” can be uncertain, see SCHAUER,
supra note 21, at 58–59, 212–14 (describing famous debate on this language between
H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller—and its significance for jurisprudence more generally).
37.
Wright, supra note 34, at 728–32.
38.
Schuck, supra note 34, at 3.
39.
Id. at 4; see also Diver, supra note 21, at 67–68; Miller, supra note 34, at 12.
40.
EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 25–27.
41.
Id. at 27.
42.
Wright, supra note 34, at 723.
43.
Id. at 724.
44.
Miller, supra note 34, at 12.
45.
Schuck, supra note 34, at 16–17; see also Diver, supra note 21, at 67; Wright,
supra note 34, at 726.
46.
Miller, supra note 34, at 12.
47.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 42.
48.
Wright, supra note 34, at 721 (describing as complex a dispute “in which any
resolution is likely to have difficult-to-predict, indirect consequences for the parties and
for other groups perhaps not directly represented in the legal dispute,” and identifying
this with Lon Fuller’s concept of a “polycentric” dispute (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 (1978))).
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variety, and difficulty of different determinations a
decision-maker is required to make (or questions a
decision-maker is required to answer) in applying a legal
requirement.49 A requirement is simpler to the extent it requires
fewer determinations; to the extent it involves determinations
similar in type to each other; and to the extent those
determinations are relatively simple for the relevant person
(most likely either the decision-maker or the target of regulation)
to make.50 As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, below, the
simplicity or complexity of a legal requirement is independent of
whether the requirement is structured as a rule or a standard.51
Complexity is also associated with the costs of promulgating a
legal requirement. At least with respect to rule-like
requirements, complexity will typically increase the cost of rule
promulgation.52
One problem in discussing the complexity of legal
requirements is that the effect of complexity varies with the
resources available to the entity attempting to determine what
the law requires.53 It is useful to think of legal complexity as
having an absolute value, but with effect of that absolute value
having a different effect on different primary actors and
law-appliers.54 Deciphering complex legal requirements entails
costs. These costs have two effects on primary actors. Up to a
certain point (with that point varying among different entities),
complex requirements simply raise compliance costs (and
accordingly reduce profit margins) for the activity in question.
Past that point, however, the costs of deciphering a complex legal
49.
See Wright, supra note 34, at 723.
50.
Miller, supra note 34, at 12.
51.
Or, more precisely, the location of a legal requirement on the
simplicity-complexity axis is independent of where the requirement is located on the
rule-standard axis. However, as discussed infra Part IV, this is not the case for the
location of a legal requirement on the certainty-uncertainty continuum. The location of a
legal requirement on the certainty-uncertainty continuum can depend, to a significant
degree, on where the requirement falls in a quadrant made up of perpendicular,
intersecting simplicity-complexity and rule-standard axes.
52.
See Hirsch, supra note 34, at 1237; see also Kaplow, supra note 21, at 579–80.
53.
Available resources can include intellectual capacity, experience, training, and
time available—and of course money, which can be used to purchase assistance in
deciphering a complex requirement. One example of the role of intellectual capacity,
experience, and training is the highly detailed set of rules that airline pilots must
internalize—and be able to act on at an instant’s notice. See Tullock, supra note 13, at
206.
54.
In other words, a legal requirement has an objective level of complexity. But
this objective level of complexity has a different set of subjective effects on different
primary actors and law-appliers, each of which has a different cost–benefit calculation to
make with respect to the value of becoming informed about the content of the
requirement.
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requirement outweigh the associated benefits of compliance.55 In
such a situation, entities can do one of two things: (1) ignore the
requirement and suffer the consequences if their noncompliance
becomes known; or (2) cease or avoid engaging in the activities
the complex requirement governs.
Because the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance will
vary among primary actors (and perhaps even among judicial
and quasi-judicial decision-makers), caution is required when
making blanket statements about the effects of complexity. The
costs of complexity are not evenly distributed.
III. LEGAL, FACTUAL, AND LAW-FACT UNCERTAINTY
Legal uncertainty is not the only type of uncertainty
confronting primary actors.56 Factual uncertainty and law-fact
uncertainty exist as well, and both play a role in the
decision-making of primary actors. Accordingly, even complete
legal certainty cannot come close to eliminating the uncertainty
faced by primary actors in their interactions with the law. This
Part identifies key aspects of how legal, factual, and law-fact
uncertainty each operate. As this Part will demonstrate, the
scope of factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty is huge.
Once factual and law-fact uncertainty are taken into
consideration, legal uncertainty plays a much diminished role.
Part III.A addresses legal uncertainty, or uncertainty about
the content of the law. It addresses two factors critical to
understanding the role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design.
The first is time—whether the uncertainty pertains to past,
present, or future law. The second is form—whether the
uncertain legal requirement is a rule or a standard, and whether
the requirement is simple or complex.57

55.
Cf. Kaplow, supra note 34, at 151. Specifically, Kaplow points out that the costs
of acquiring information about the content of a legal requirement (which increase with the
complexity of the requirement) are an important component of a primary actor’s
compliance costs. And, accordingly, a more complex requirement will result in lower
overall compliance than a less complex requirement mandating similar behavior.
56.
See supra Part II.A.
57.
This Article does not take the position that simplicity and complexity are solely
matters of form. Simplicity and complexity have substantive components as well.
However, the Article does take the position that a legal requirement’s form (as well as its
substance) can range from simple to complex. This simplicity-complexity continuum can
be modeled as intersecting with the traditional rules-standards continuum to provide a
better framework for analysis than the rules-standards continuum alone. See Muchmore,
supra note 21, at 176–80 (providing and illustrating this model); see also Kaplow, supra
note 21, at 588–90 (suggesting that both rules and standards can be either simple or
complex).
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Part III.B addresses factual uncertainty, or uncertainty
about facts in the world. It addresses three factors critical to
understanding the role of factual uncertainty in regulatory
design. The first, like legal uncertainty, is time—factual
uncertainty plays different roles depending on whether it relates
to past, present, or future facts. The second is the degree to
which factual uncertainty involves the limits of scientific
knowledge. Many regulatory programs involve decisions on
issues where no scientific consensus exists or where the
consensus changes dramatically over short periods of time. The
third is the degree to which human observational capacities and
resources constrain our ability to learn relevant facts.
Part III.C addresses law-fact uncertainty, or uncertainty
about how a decision-maker—a judge, jury, or agency—will apply
law to fact.58 It addresses four factors critical to understanding
the role of law-fact uncertainty in regulatory design. The first is
the degree to which the law is certain with respect to the issue in
question. The second is the range of attitudes or ideologies held
by potential decision-makers. This range is affected heavily by
the procedures by which decision-makers are chosen and the
population from which they are drawn. The third is the degree to
which the relevant decision-maker is subject to outside influence
(whether proper or improper). The fourth is the degree to which
the decision made in a given case will limit the decision-makers’
range of discretion in similar, future decisions.
A. Legal Uncertainty
Legal uncertainty is uncertainty about the content of the
It has attracted the attention of writers for centuries.
Much of the work comes from those engaged in broader
jurisprudential debates about the relevance of legal uncertainty
for the nature of law or the obligation to obey the law.60 I draw on
law.59

58.
See supra note 17.
59.
The preferred term in current jurisprudential writing for what this Article calls
“legal uncertainty” is “indeterminacy.” This Article uses the term “legal uncertainty”
instead because it is more easily comprehensible to those not familiar with technical
jurisprudential writing and matches better with writing outside the jurisprudential field.
It also emphasizes the relationship this Article strives to highlight between legal
uncertainty and two related topics, factual uncertainty and law-fact uncertainty.
60.
Jurisprudential views of legal uncertainty range over a broad spectrum. At one
extreme is Ronald Dworkin’s view that legal uncertainty does not exist, as there is a
single right answer even in hard cases. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
279–90 (1977). At the other extreme is Anthony D’Amato’s view that legal certainty does
not exist, as there is no such thing as an easy case with a single right answer. See
Anthony D’Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 167–68 (1990).
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this work for the light it shines on the practical function of legal
uncertainty in regulatory systems. But it is not my goal to
engage in these broader jurisprudential debates. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that a broad range of
jurisprudential views are compatible with the idea that
real-world legal requirements can, as a practical matter, have
different levels of legal certainty.61
Outside the technical jurisprudential field, the focus of
writing about legal uncertainty moves away from the question of
whether it exists in theory or is compatible with the rule of law.
Instead, writers focus on legal uncertainty’s practical effects.
A substantial portion of this writing focuses on how judges
should respond to legal uncertainty in two relationships: the
relationship between legislatures and judges, and the
relationship between higher courts and lower courts. In recent
decades, Justice Antonin Scalia was the most prominent judicial
advocate of this vision of legal certainty, advocating rules over

There are, of course, a wide range of perspectives in between complete legal
certainty and complete legal uncertainty. H.L.A. Hart saw legal uncertainty as a real but
marginal phenomenon tied to the open texture of language. HART, supra note 22, at
128–32; BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 74 (2007). Timothy Endicott sees law as
necessarily vague, to a nontrivial degree. TIMOTHY A. O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 2
(2000) (arguing that vagueness makes the law uncertain “in some cases but not in all
cases”).
The legal realists viewed legal uncertainty as a broader phenomenon tied to
conflicting, legitimate interpretive approaches and the specific facts of each individual
case. LEITER, supra, at 74–75. Among the realists, a mainstream group saw legal
uncertainty as limited by the cultural norms, including the relatively similar background
and experiences of the individuals who became judges. Id. at 28–30. Leiter describes this
as realism’s “Sociological Wing.” Id. at 28. This group included Karl Llewellyn, Underhill
Moore, Herber Oliphant, Felix Cohen, and Max Radin. Id. at 29. A smaller, more radical
group of realists saw the idiosyncratic personal experiences of each individual judge as
injecting a much larger element of legal uncertainty. Id. at 28–30. Leiter describes this as
realism’s “Idiosyncracy Wing.” Id. at 28. Jerome Frank was the most prominent member
of this group; it also included Joseph Hutcheson and Edward Robinson. Id.
61.
Even Ronald Dworkin, probably the best-known proponent of complete legal
certainty as a theoretical matter, does not argue that human decision-makers can know
they have reached a legally correct decision. See DWORKIN, supra note 60, at 279–90. This
possibility is open only to the idealized decision-maker he calls Hercules. Id. at 105–06.
And Dworkin expressly admits the possibility that there are both easy cases and hard
cases. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 353–54 (1986). On the other side, even those who
argue (or approach arguing) that the law is completely indeterminate in theory do not
appear to challenge the idea that, as a practical matter, some legal requirements lead to a
more predictable set of outcomes than others do. See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 60, at 171
(“For the Pragmatic Indeterminist, judges do not behave randomly or unpredictably over
the long run of cases; . . . lawyers can predict how judges will probably decide a given case
or line of cases.”). Thus, whatever one’s view of the scope of legal uncertainty in theory,
there is value to considering the practical role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design.
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standards in the form of legal requirements,62 textualism in
statutory interpretation,63 and originalism in constitutional
interpretation.64 And, as one would expect for views set out so
forcefully by a long-serving Supreme Court Justice, there has
been no shortage of responses to Justice Scalia’s views.65
Other writings look at the role of legal certainty in specific
fields, often with a focus on the role of rules and standards. This
has been done in numerous legal fields, including administrative
law, antitrust,66 civil procedure,67 constitutional law,68
international conflict-of-laws,69 property,70 and torts.71
Although it remains standard to assume that legal certainty
is an unalloyed good, there is a growing literature suggesting
that legal certainty may have some disadvantages—and legal
uncertainty some positive attributes. First, Shawn Bayern has
argued that lawyers and judges often overstate the value of legal
certainty when making common-law arguments or decisions.72

62.
Scalia, supra note 6.
63.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 6; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
3, 23–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
64.
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–36 (2008) (Scalia, J.);
see also Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller:
Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1064
(2009) (“Whatever version of originalism was on display, it was the predominant mode of
argument for the majority.”). In arguing for each of these, Scalia’s rhetoric focused on the
need for these largely formalist approaches as a way to constrain judicial discretion.
Scalia, supra note 63, at 25 (“Of all of the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most
mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic! The rule
of law is about form.”). In other words, Scalia’s view was that law must be treated as
certain to prevent judges from imposing their own policy preferences in the guise of
deciding concrete cases.
65.
This is, of course, an understatement. No footnote could possibly contain the full
range of responses to Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential vision. For a few notable responses,
see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 41–47
(1994); Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295,
1328–30 (2008); Richard A. Posner, How Nuanced Is Justice Scalia’s Judicial Philosophy?
An Exchange, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/107001/how
-nuanced-justice-scalias-judicial-philosophy-exchange.
66.
Crane, supra note 21, at 55.
67.
Dodson, supra note 13, at 56–59 (suggesting that legal uncertainty cannot be
eliminated from the law of federal subject-matter jurisdiction).
68.
Sullivan, supra note 21, at 56–69.
69.
Muchmore, supra note 21, at 183–86.
70.
Rose, supra note 21, at 582–83.
71.
Rabin, supra note 12, at 431–38 (describing the historical development of tort
law from a largely rule-based system to one in which rules and standards “resolved into a
state of equipoise”).
72.
Bayern, supra note 13, at 53 (maintaining that “arguments about certainty are
often mistaken, that certainty itself is often misunderstood, and that many defenses of
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Second, legal certainty may not be realistically attainable—and
accordingly not worth the effort.73 Third, legal uncertainty can
make it possible—when lawmakers wish to do so—to reduce,
rather than increase, the degree to which legal rules affect
primary behavior.74 Fourth, in some situations, uncertain legal
requirements make it easier for people to predict the legal
consequences of their actions than would be possible with a more
certain requirement.75
Overall, a legal requirement tends to be more certain to the
extent it is expressed as a rule rather than a standard; is
associated with a body of jurisprudence treating it as a rule; has
in the recent past led to similar outcomes over a wide range of
fact situations; and is not closely associated with other rules that
would lead to a different outcome. A legal requirement tends to
be less certain to the extent it is expressed as a standard rather
than a rule; is associated with jurisprudence treating it as a
standard; has in the past led to disparate outcomes in seemingly
similar fact situations; or is closely associated with an alternative
legal requirement (especially if structured as a rule) that would
lead to disparate outcomes if applied in its place.
Two factors critical to understanding the way legal
uncertainty operates are time and legal form. Part III.A.1
addresses time, with an emphasis on the relationship between
certainty in legal rules are tautological, irrelevant, or substantively overstated”). Bayern’s
argument focuses on the degree to which “social judgments” may require changes in case
outcomes and legal rules. Id. at 55–56. Bayern discusses specific examples where he
believes certainty-related arguments to be either wholly irrelevant or far outweighed by
other substantive concerns. Id. at 58. These include situations where doctrinal stability is
irrelevant to the issue in question, id. at 62–68, and situations where having a rule that is
certain is irrelevant to the issue in question. Id. at 68–75. Bayern then critiques
arguments for legal certainty based on the nature of law. Id. at 76–86. Specifically,
Bayern disagrees with arguments by Larry Alexander and the early F.A. Hayek that legal
certainty is necessary to the rule of law. Id. Bayern sides instead with Melvin Eisenberg’s
position that some legal uncertainty is a permanent and necessary feature of common-law
systems. Id. (citing MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 43–49
(1988)). He then criticizes arguments for legal certainty based on grounds of economic
efficiency. Id. at 87–89.
Bayern’s core claim—that arguments for legal certainty are often overstated—is
correct. However, the roots of those overstatements go deeper, and spread more broadly,
than Bayern asserts. The roots go deeper for two reasons. First, factual uncertainty, see
infra Part III.B, and law-fact uncertainty, see infra Part III.C, reduce the degree to which
even true legal certainty allows primary actors to know in advance the types of civil
liability (or criminal charges) they could face. Second, there are fundamental limits on the
degree to which efforts to increase legal certainty can be successful. Past a certain point,
efforts to increase legal certainty will tend to reduce legal certainty instead. See infra Part
IV.
73.
See Dodson, supra note 13, at 55.
74.
See Feldman & Lifshitz, supra note 13, at 166; Diver, supra note 21, at 78.
75.
Raban, supra note 13, at 183.
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uncertainty about past, present, and future law. Part III.A.2
briefly addresses legal form, with an emphasis on the
rule-standard and simple-complex dimensions. This discussion of
legal form will be developed in more detail in Part IV.
1. Time. The manner in which legal uncertainty operates
depends in part on the temporal relationship between the legal
uncertainty and the time at which a primary actor is making a
decision. Legal uncertainty can operate with respect to past,
present, or future law.
Uncertainty with respect to past law involves uncertainty
about future civil or criminal liability for a past action.76 Such
uncertainty will impact the assessment of current or future
budgets, political capital, and research or education
expenditures. For example, this uncertainty impacts the amount
of formal or informal liability reserves a primary actor might
choose to hold.
Uncertainty with respect to present law involves uncertainty
with respect to whether a contemplated course of action will
subject a primary actor to civil or criminal liability. To the extent
the future is assumed to resemble the present, it will also affect a
primary actor’s longer-term decisions about a particular course of
action. This type of uncertainty prompts groups or individuals to
complain that existing law fails to provide sufficiently concrete
guidance.77
Uncertainty with respect to future law involves uncertainty
about what changes in the law some future lawmaker will (or
will not) make.78 This is a huge source of uncertainty that is
always present when contemplating an action beyond the very
near future. Particularly salient examples involve tax law (where
long-term investment decisions may involve tax advantages that
could be repealed by a future lawmaker), decisions to invest in
new technologies (where later-emerging health and safety
concerns could lead to regulatory actions, up to and including

76.
For a dramatic example, see A Legal Hazard for Brazil’s Banks: The Past Is
Epilogue, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2014, at 70, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and
-economics/21595940-row-over-25-year-old-account-adjustments-unnerves-brazilian
-lenders-past.
77.
See, e.g., The Dodd-Frank Act: Too Big Not to Fail, supra note 8.
78.
On congressional uncertainty about how authority Congress delegates will be
implemented, see Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process
or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 55–60 (1982); Morris P. Fiorina,
Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 33 (1986).
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bars on any use of a once-promising technology), and laws that
shape the overall structure of an industry (such as health care).79
2. Legal Form. The manner in which legal uncertainty
operates also depends in part on just where a legal requirement
lies on the rule-standard and simplicity-complexity dimensions.80
The general assumption of existing literature is that rules tend
to produce legal certainty and standards tend to produce
uncertainty.81 The general assumption is also that more detailed
(and thus more complex) legal requirements tend to provide more
certainty than less detailed ones.82 Both of these are true—but
only up to a point. After that point, making a requirement either
more rule-like or more complex reduces that requirement’s
overall legal certainty. Because Part IV addresses this topic in
detail, further discussion of the relationship between legal
uncertainty and legal form will be delayed until then.
This Part (III.A) has focused on legal certainty. It has
suggested that legal certainty is tied to two related concepts. The
first is the time at which the uncertainty exists; the second is the
form in which the legal requirement is structured. Next, Part
III.B turns to a type of uncertainty that exists not only in law,
but in all other fields of endeavor: uncertainty about actual facts
as they exist in the world.
B. Factual Uncertainty
Factual uncertainty is fundamentally different from legal
uncertainty. It is also far more common. Factual uncertainty
—uncertainty about the world as it exists—impacts every
human endeavor. But factual uncertainty plays a special role
in situations where an individual or group must make
determinations about some state of the world with legal or
quasi-legal 83 consequences. Lawmakers, 84 primary actors,85

79.
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct 2566, 2608 (2012)
(upholding Affordable Care Act against first major challenge); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct.
2480, 2495–96 (2015) (upholding Affordable Care Act against second major challenge).
80.
See infra text accompanying notes 116–118.
81.
See, e.g., Parchemovsky & Stein, supra note 9, at 173.
82.
There are, of course, important exceptions here. For others taking the position
that standards can at times be more certain than rules, see, for example, Rose, supra note
21, at 609; Schlag, supra note 21, at 405–13. Also see further discussion infra Part V.A.
83.
I include quasi-legal consequences explicitly to include private regulatory bodies
that have not been delegated any official authority by the state. Basic decisions by private
regulatory bodies (to admit or exclude, to provide or not provide resources, etc.) can have
substantial impacts within the relevant community that are not distant in effect from
those made by government authorities.
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regulatory enforcers,86 and those who serve as factfinders in
formal disputes 87 must all make these types of
determinations. As H.L.A. Hart recognized, there is a deep
relationship between legal and factual uncertainty. 88 Perfect

84.
Lawmakers must make numerous factual determinations in the law-making or
rule-making process. For example, a legislator considering, in the late 1970s, whether to
support the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act might have asked himself some of the following
questions: Is foreign bribery a problem? If so, is it a big enough one that we should
regulate it? If so, what type of legal requirement would be effective in reaching this
conduct? How will this regulatory program impact our political support for future
regulatory programs? Could the resources this program would require be better used in
another program? Will this make American multinational businesses uncompetitive in
global markets? Some of this decision-making will be done in formal fact-finding
proceedings such as legislative or agency hearings. But far more is of the informal type
that all individuals must make when deciding how to allocate their time and effort.
Legal certainty does not alter the need to make these decisions, and may not
even alter the allocation decisions themselves. A strict liability regime with low damage
payments may result in the same spending on worker or product safety as a negligence
regime with higher damage payments if the expected value under both regimes is the
same. It is the result of the expected value calculation, not the degree to which liability in
individual cases is certain, that will determine the relevant allocation decisions. And it is
the range of possible factual scenarios, rather than possible legal scenarios, which is
likely to drive the expected value calculation.
85.
Primary actors must make numerous factual assumptions in their day to day
affairs precisely because of the legal consequences different facts may have. For example,
a company must decide how to allocate resources between worker safety, product safety,
research, insurance, and marketing. It cannot spend infinitely on any one of these and
remain in business. Its allocation decisions must rest on a set of assumptions about likely
injuries, new products, and sales that will be generated by each of these spending
categories.
86.
Regulatory enforcers must make factual determinations about whether a person
or entity is doing something that might violate a legal requirement. Sometimes this is
fairly clear, such as when a police officer uses radar to clock a car speeding at 90 mph. At
other times, especially in the regulation of business, the regulator may not be able to
observe whether potentially illegal behavior is taking place until after initiating the
investigation. At this point, legal certainty may work for or against the regulator. If a
regulatory requirement is legally certain, the regulator cannot enforce it successfully
unless it finds very specific facts in its investigation. For such a certain requirement, even
a large amount of evidence of general bad behavior is not sufficient. When a regulatory
requirement is less certain (but still of similar scope), however, the types of evidence that
can be used to support a violation may be broader. This makes it much harder for a
company to skirt the precise edge of a regulation by avoiding certain actions while still
behaving in a manner very much outside the spirit of the regulatory requirement.
87.
This is the type of factual uncertainty that served as a focus of Jerome Frank’s
work. Frank’s view of law was based heavily on the factual uncertainty involved in
trial-court decisions. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960, at 165–67
(1986) (discussing Frank’s fact skepticism and noting that, while Frank “wobbled” in some
of his views, “he never ceased to emphasize that the principal cause of legal uncertainty
was [factual] subjectivity at the trial court level”). Frank identified himself as part of a
group of “fact skeptics” who “think[] that . . . the pursuit of greatly increased legal
certainty is, for the most part, futile” because of extensive factual uncertainty. JEROME
FRANK, Preface to the Sixth Printing of LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, at xi–xii (Anchor
Books 1963) (1930).
88.
HART, supra note 22, at 128.
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certainty about legal consequences cannot exist in a world
where we do not have perfect information about future states
of the world. 89 As Daniel Farber has highlighted, factual
uncertainty becomes increasingly important when it involves
complex systems with the potential for feedback effects.90
These effects make outcomes (whether positive or negative)
both more extreme and more likely than might otherwise be
thought. 91
Three factors relevant to factual certainty are time (past,
present, or future), limits on scientific knowledge, and limits on
human observational capacity.92 Each will be discussed in turn
below.
1. Time. As with legal uncertainty, the significance of
factual uncertainty varies based on timing. Uncertainty with
respect to past facts impacts civil and criminal dispute resolution
(where fact-finding is a core aspect), forward-looking regulatory
programs that seek to compensate for something that has taken
place in the past, and efforts to set appropriate compensation for
past events. Environmental regulation is a particularly
important example. A core problem in efforts to combat global
warming or maintain safe drinking water is uncertainty about
how much damage has in fact been done in the past. Uncertainty
with respect to present facts impacts daily decision-making by
both regulators and primary actors.93 For example, regulators
might ask questions such as: Has the recession ended? Does this
new drug have dangerous side effects? Is this bridge safe?
Similarly, primary actors might ask: Is our product safe? Is the
driver swerving in the lane ahead drunk? Do consumers have a
favorable view or our business?
Uncertainty with respect to future facts impacts
forward-looking regulatory programs, strategic planning (and

89.
Id. Hart viewed all legal systems as a compromise between the general need for
legal certainty and the need for some flexibility in applying law to unanticipated future
fact situations. Id. at 130. He saw the balance between certainty and flexibility as one
that could vary broadly between legal systems and over periods of time within the same
legal system. Id. at 130–31.
90.
See generally Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 920–27 (2011).
91.
See id.
92.
The universe of factual uncertainty is broad, and I do not mean to suggest that
the factors listed here are the only relevant ones. They are simply three factors
particularly important to the relationship between factual uncertainty and regulatory
systems.
93.
Cf. HOLMES, supra note 12, at 304 (“Any present fact which is unknown to the
parties is just as uncertain for the purposes of making an arrangement at this moment, as
any future fact.”).
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basic decision-making) by primary actors, and determinations of
appropriate penalties in deterrence-based systems.94
2. Scientific Knowledge. Although it overlaps to some
degree with uncertainty as to more basic facts, uncertainty with
respect to scientific knowledge has particular characteristics
worth addressing separately.95 At least two types of uncertainty
with respect to scientific knowledge are important to regulatory
programs. First, when no scientific consensus exists, regulators
must deal with uncertainty about which scientific positions to
credit. Second, some uncertainty with respect to scientific
knowledge is always present even if scientists are generally in
agreement at a particular point in time. As the Supreme Court
famously remarked in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., “[T]here are no certainties in science.”96 Although the Court
prefaced this remark with a precatory “arguably,’’ it is accepted
in the history and philosophy of science that all scientific theories
are subject to revision.97 Although some scientific facts are quite
secure, many firmly held scientific beliefs have been set aside in
favor of newer theories. Much of what we “know” today will likely
be shown, in the future, to be incorrect.98
3. Observational Capacity and Observational Resources.
Scientific and other uncertainty exists, in part, because of limits
in human observational capacity. These limits are one source of
both scientific and factual uncertainty. The simple fact that a
phenomenon occurs in our presence does not mean that it is
observed in a way that can be useful to any regulatory program.

94.
On the tendency of any statute to become obsolete over time, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5–7 (1982); GRANT GILMORE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96–97 (1977). On obsolete Supreme Court decisions, see id. at
97–98. On the difficulties involved in decisions to commit resources to combat future
risks, see Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the
Undervaluation of Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1517–20 (2010).
95.
On scientific uncertainty, see generally HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND
LIBERTY, supra note 9, at 8–17; Richard A. Merrill, Risk-Benefit Decisionmaking by the
Food and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 1003–06 (1977).
96.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
97.
However, not all revisions—even those that amount to paradigm shifts—alter
the established facts within the older paradigm. Newton’s inverse square law for
gravitational attraction, for example, remains useful and reasonably accurate in
important domains notwithstanding Einstein’s more complex field equations.
98.
Cf. DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 8.7.2 (2d ed. 2011) (collecting
recent examples from the history of medicine); POSNER, supra note 21, at 64–65
(discussing broadly-accepted scientific theories later proved false and providing reasons
why it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to ever prove a scientific theory is true).

(4) Muchmore_Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

2016]

UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY

5/22/16 7:22 PM

1347

Moreover, observation can be costly. Even basic visual, oral,
and olfactory observation requires a person’s time; techniques
requiring specialized equipment or expertise will often be more
expensive.99
In sum, factual certainty is tied to three related concepts:
time; scientific knowledge; and human observational capacity
and resources. But uncertainty about facts, as well as
uncertainty about the law, is only part of the picture. Even a
primary actor that knows the facts and the law with certainty
encounters uncertainty about the application of law to fact.
C. Law-Fact Uncertainty
Law-fact uncertainty is uncertainty about the way the
ultimate decision-maker will apply law to fact.100 This type of
uncertainty is best understood by taking both the law itself and
the facts to which it is to be applied as a given constant. Even
with the law and facts at a given constant, different
decision-makers will reach different conclusions on how the law
applies to some sets of facts. The reasons for this uncertainty can
include: the decision-maker’s competence; the range of potential
ideologies of the decision-maker, the decision-maker’s
susceptibility to outside influence, and the degree to which the
decision today will affect the decision-maker’s future freedom of
decision.
1. Decision-Maker’s Competence.
The first factor
implicating the degree of law-fact uncertainty is the
decision-maker’s competence. A decision-maker without the
background, intellectual capacity, resources, or time necessary to
understand the law or the facts will be prone to error. For
example, there may be cases where the factual or legal issues are
sufficiently complex to be beyond the ability of many
decision-makers to understand. This is particularly relevant in

99.
A few examples of expensive technological aids to perception are night vision
equipment, latent fingerprint development and identification, STR-based DNA profiling,
satellite imaging, mass spectroscopy, medical imaging, and data mining techniques. Of
course, some technologies operate at a sufficiently broad scale that they are less expensive
than simple sensory observation. GPS tracking of an automobile, for example, permits
extended surveillance that would be prohibitively expensive if conducted by a team of
observers seeking to keep the vehicle in sight at all times. See United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
100.
On the standards of decision involved in applications of law to fact, see
generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, STANDARDS OF DECISION IN LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LOGICAL BASES FOR THE STANDARD OF PROOF, HERE AND ABROAD (2013).
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cases with large amounts of evidence or highly technical expert
testimony.
2. Range of Potential Attitudes or Ideologies. The second
factor impacting the degree of law-fact uncertainty is the range of
attitudes or values potentially held by the decision-maker.101 This
means that the identity of the decision-maker is likely to be more
important where a decision is being made before the
decision-maker has been identified;102 where a large number of
different individuals (or groups of individuals) could be the
ultimate decision-makers; and where there is significant
ideological disagreement among the politically influential groups
from whom decision-makers are drawn.103
3. Decision-Makers’ Susceptibility to Outside Influence.
The third factor influencing the degree of law-fact uncertainty is
the degree to which the decision-maker may be susceptible to
outside influence. While the potential attitudes or ideologies of
the decision-maker are likely to be tied in significant part to the
groups from which the decision-makers are drawn, here we are
looking instead at the attitudes and ideologies of present (and
potentially future) groups whose favor the decision-maker would
like to have (or whose wrath the decision-maker would like to
avoid).
This could include, for re-appointable decision-makers, those
responsible for reappointment; for civil servants, those
responsible for pay and promotion decisions; for elected officials
(including state judges), the electorates responsible for

101.
On the degree to which a similar range of attitudes, values, or professional
conventions increase the predictability of decisions, at least at a particular time and
place, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19–20
(1960); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION 14 (1990). On the way these attitudes, values, or
professional conventions change over time, see id. at 16–19. On the relationship between
ideology and random case assignment in a pool of decision-makers, see Adam M. Samaha,
Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 55–57 (2009). On the
attitudinal model of judicial decision-making, see generally Howard Gillman, What’s Law
Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision
Making, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 467, 485–86 (2001) (reviewing HAROLD J. SPAETH &
JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999)).
102.
This includes a tremendous amount of primary conduct. Consider, as one
example, tort law, which provides incentives for primary conduct even though—at the
time the conduct takes place—the state, court system, judicial district, and applicable
substantive law are often undetermined or even unknowable.
103.
This could include groups politically influential in the present (to which
decision-makers may currently be beholden) and groups politically influential in the past,
from which long-serving decision-makers (such as federal judges) may have been drawn.
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re-election (or recall) or the political parties responsible for
determining whether a decision-maker reappears on a ballot;104
and for nearly any decision-maker, those who could potentially
appoint the decision-maker to higher profile or higher-paying
positions.105
4. Degree to Which Today’s Decision Will Affect Future
Decisions. The fourth factor influencing the amount of law-fact
uncertainty on a particular issue is the degree to which a
decision could affect future decisions.106 This could involve either
the precedential effect of the current decision or the extent to
which the current decision might impact the decision-makers’
future identity or composition.
The precedential effect of the current decision on future
cases constrains a decision-maker in three respects. First, it may
limit the decision-maker’s freedom of decision in future cases
through its formal or informal precedential effect.107 Second, it
may restrict the freedom of lower-level decision-makers (such as
lower courts or lower-level agency officials) in the
decision-making hierarchy.108 Third, it may drain the
decision-maker’s political capital, limiting its ability to depart
from precedent in future cases.109

104.
Cf. John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 853–55 (1985) (noting the dominant role of party selection of judicial nominees
in Cook County, Illinois).
105.
An important note is due here. The types of outside influence involved are not
all improper. As one example, drafters of state constitutions would not have made judges
face elections if they did not want them to be—at least in some broad sense—influenced
by their prospects for re-election. This is balanced, at least in part, by the fact that an
electoral challenger can make an election issue out of any decision that appears to have
gone beyond the proper bounds of decision-making based on applicable facts and law.
106.
On the forward-looking role of precedent, see Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (“[Although] [a]n argument from precedent seems at
first to look backward[,] . . . in an equally if not more important way, an argument from
precedent looks forward as well, asking us to view today’s decision as a precedent for
tomorrow’s decisionmakers.”).
107.
Id. at 576–79.
108.
Id. at 576.
109.
In discussing the role of precedent in Supreme Court decision-making,
Frederick Schauer concludes that a strong norm of following horizontal precedent
“appears now not to exist and . . . appears not to have existed for at least several
generations.” Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme
Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 397 (2007). Nevertheless, the justices write their
opinions as if precedent did constrain them, see id. at 382 & n.4, and are subject to
criticism (from dissenting justices and outside commentators) when they appear to
disregard it. See, e.g., id. at 382–85 (noting extensive criticism of the Roberts Court for
perceived failures to follow horizontal precedent). Moreover, it is worth noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court suffers legitimacy costs even when it issues decisions that are
perceived as substantively correct—when those decisions rely on a substantial departure
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The degree of law-fact uncertainty on a high-profile issue
can also be affected by the degree to which a current decision
might influence the decision-making institution’s future identity
or composition.110 A classic example (and one usually viewed
today as positive)111 is the U.S. Supreme Court’s change of
heart—in the wake of President Franklin Roosevelt’s
Court-packing plan—on the constitutionality of New Deal
programs.112 A more recent example is the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Bush v. Gore, which effectively determined the
outcome of the 2000 presidential election.113 Had a justice retired
or passed away during the first term of George W. Bush’s
presidency, President Bush’s opportunity to appoint a Supreme
Court justice would have been a fairly direct result of the Bush v.
Gore decision.114 Other significant examples tied less to a decision
in a single case include the possible role of the Warren Court’s
pro-defendant criminal procedure decisions in leading to the
establishment of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.115
This Part (III.C) has focused on law-fact uncertainty. It has
suggested that law-fact uncertainty is tied to four related factors:
the decision-maker’s competence; the range of attitudes or
ideologies potentially held by the relevant decision-maker; the
decision-maker’s susceptibility to outside influence; and the
degree to which the current decision may increase or decrease
the decision-maker’s future discretion.
from existing precedent. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, Foreword to FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, at vii
(2004) (“Every teacher of constitutional law must ultimately make peace with Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) . . . .”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31–35 (1959) (strongly criticizing Brown’s
reasoning while implying substantive agreement with the outcome).
110.
This is apparent with respect to a limited number of high profile cases in the
U.S. Supreme Court, but a similar phenomenon likely affects other courts (especially
state courts chosen by election) and politically appointed agency officials (in both
independent and non-independent agencies).
111.
See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 94, at 15.
112.
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
113.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). On the Bush v. Gore decision, see generally
THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001).
114.
The chain of causation is far more attenuated with respect to the two
nominations President George W. Bush was able to make following his 2004 re-election.
115.
See Eric A. Posner, Casual with the Court, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 23, 2011),
https://newrepublic.com/article/94516/nixons-court-kevin-mcmahon (reviewing KEVIN J.
MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES (2011)) (noting that “[Nixon] sought a justice who would support his
anti-busing and pro-law-and-order position” and accordingly “chose Warren Burger, who
had delivered speeches taking Nixon’s line on law-and-order”); id. (“[Nixon] wanted a
court that would moderate the Warren Court’s opinions on busing and the rights of
criminal defendants, and that is what he got.”).
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To summarize, three broad types of uncertainty affect
regulation of conduct by the legal system: legal uncertainty;
factual uncertainty; and law-fact uncertainty. Examining the
broad range of fact and law-fact uncertainty, however, it appears
that the concern frequently focused on legal uncertainty may be
overstated. Legal certainty is often desirable, but it is insufficient
to give primary actors a solid background against which to plan.
Factual uncertainty is pervasive, and law-fact uncertainty
reduces the degree to which legal certainty gives parties any
definite information about how the law will be applied to their
conduct. The next Part focuses on the relationship between legal
uncertainty, legal complexity, and legal form—and questions
whether legal certainty can be realized.
IV. THE LIMITS OF LEGAL CERTAINTY
This Part argues that there are fundamental limits on how
much certainty can be achieved through the law.116 These limits
can be illuminated by discussion of the relationship between
legal uncertainty and legal form. Legal requirements can be
understood as points or regions in a space with two axes117—a
horizontal axis ranging from rules to standards and a vertical
axis ranging from simple to complex.118
Under this model, there are two basic ways of changing the
degree of certainty that characterizes a particular legal

116.
The focus of this discussion is on uncertainty about present content of the law,
but much of the discussion should also apply to uncertainty about past or future content
of the law as well.
117.
A prior article by this Author uses the term spectrum rather than axis, and
models both spectra as extending in a potentially infinite space in each direction.
Muchmore, supra note 21, at 180. After further discussions with a colleague, I now believe
that this should be modified as follows. First, the rule-standard axis should be bounded at
each end, as there do seem to be pure rules and pure standards. A pure rule would be a
requirement that indicated “no” to any question about whether something was permitted
or, alternatively, a requirement that indicated “yes” to any question about whether
something was permitted. A pure standard would be something that instructed a
decision-maker to use his or her unbounded discretion. Second, the simple-complex axis
should be bounded at the “simple” end but extend to infinity on the “complex” side. At one
end, with pure simplicity, no legal requirement would exist at all. With no law to
constrain behavior, the legality of every action can be determined with no effort.
Complexity extends to infinity because it should always be possible to make something
more complex by adding additional specificity or creating additional, related
requirements. It also follows that there should be a precise midpoint on the rule-standard
axis, but no precise midpoint on the simple-complex axis.
118.
For a detailed illustration, see Muchmore, supra note 21, at 180. This models
the horizontal axis with rules on the left and standards on the right. It models the vertical
axis with simple at the top, and complex at the bottom. This puts simple rules in the
upper-left quadrant, simple standards in the upper-right quadrant, complex rules in the
lower-left quadrant, and complex standards in the lower-right quadrant.
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requirement. The first is moving a legal requirement between the
“rule” and “standard” ends of the horizontal axis. This can be
done by either amending or re-interpreting the requirement to
fall at a different place on the horizontal axis. The second is
moving the requirement to a new point between the “simple” and
“complex” ends of the vertical axis. This can be done by either
amending or re-interpreting the requirement to fall at a different
place on the vertical axis.119
There are limits on how much certainty can be increased by
moving from standards to rules, or from simple to complex legal
requirements. After a given point is reached, further movement
in these directions can decrease, rather than increase, legal
certainty. As developed in this Part, there are two limits on the
degree to which making a requirement more rule-like can
increase certainty. Those limits result from the presence of other,
related rules120 and from the tendency of many human
decision-makers to seek justice in an individual case.121 Likewise,
there are two limits on the degree to which making a
requirement more complex can increase certainty.122 Those limits
result from the resources required to understand complex rules123
and from the fact that each additional consideration in a
standard provides a different ground on which a decision might
wholly or partly be based.124
A. Making Requirements More Rule-Like
1. The Problem of Inconsistent Rules. As discussed in more
detail below, the certainty of rules is reduced to the degree that
the choice between two or more rules leading to different
outcomes is underdetermined.125 The more related rules there are

119.
On characteristics that increase or decrease the complexity of a legal
requirement, see supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text.
120.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
121.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
122.
For simplicity, the discussion in the following paragraphs will refer to rules and
standards as ideal types, even though real legal requirements instead exist as a range
between those two extremes. See supra Part II.A.
123.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
124.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
125.
The argument in this Article does not depend on any specific claim about what
is and is not part of the same legal requirement. For fascinating empirical work on what
is—and is not—part of the same legal subject, see the work Michael Gilbert has done on
single-subject rules in direct democratic elections. Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert,
A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 687 (2010);
Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from Single-Subject
Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (2011); Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and
the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803 (2006).

(4) Muchmore_Final.doc (Do Not Delete)

2016]

UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY

5/22/16 7:22 PM

1353

to apply, the more likely any given rule is to conflict with the
other, related rules.126
Rule systems are internally inconsistent when, on the same
set of facts, two rules leading to two different outcomes can
legitimately be applied.127 For example, multiple rules may
purport to dictate the outcome of particular cases, with no
broadly accepted meta-rule to determine which of those rules
should be applied to a particular set of facts.128 In such a
situation, the regulatory scheme contains multiple, similarly
authoritative rules that would, if applied, lead to conflicting
outcomes.129 Common illustrations of conflicting rules include
lines of precedent in courts that rarely overrule old decisions
(such as those in place in the U.S. Supreme Court);130 canons of
statutory construction;131 and characterization decisions of courts
applying the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.132 In these
situations, uncertainty comes not from the application of any
particular rule, but from the fact that the choice of which rule to

126.
Cf. Tullock, supra note 13, at 204–06 (noting the tendency of highly detailed
legal systems to contain inconsistent requirements).
127.
See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 989. A simple example is a situation where
mainstream right-leaning jurisprudential views can be used to justify one outcome and
mainstream left-leaning jurisprudential views can be used to justify the opposite outcome.
128.
Cf. CALABRESI, supra note 94, at 179 (suggesting, with Justice Black’s advocacy
of absolutes as an example, that structuring legal requirements as rules puts power in the
hands of those in a position to choose which of various competing rules to apply to a
particular case); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06
(1950) (suggesting that, in statutory interpretation, “there are two opposing canons on
almost every point,” and listing twenty-eight pairs of opposing canons).
129.
The most accessible example here is the body of precedent produced by many
courts in the United States. As court personnel (and the rest of society) have changed over
time, many courts have been left with lines of jurisprudence setting out competing rules.
Even if courts did not have the option of modifying their precedent (or choosing to apply
standards instead of rules), it would still be difficult to predict, in many situations, which
of the competing lines of rules the relevant court would apply in the future.
130.
Wade, supra note 9, at 196 & n.32 (citing Comm’r v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,
285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). A colleague has suggested that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to overrule older precedents explicitly does not create a
system of conflicting rules, because it is standard doctrine that the newer case governs. I
agree to a point. Sometimes it is sufficiently obvious an older case is no longer valid that,
in practice, there is no real conflict with the newer case. But there are also situations
where the Court sets out a conflicting rule in a newer case while distinguishing the old
case on highly debatable grounds. In this situation, future Courts can pick between two
conflicting rules without any clear meta-rule to aid in making that choice.
131.
See Llewellyn, supra note 128, at 401–06.
132.
See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 233–35 (2d prtg. 1949) (criticizing the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws for
providing little guidance on how courts should make the often outcome-determinative
decision of how to characterize—assign to a legal category, such as tort or contract,
substance or procedure, etc.—a particular legal issue).
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apply is legally underdetermined.133 And here is the irony. In this
case, the presence of conflicting rules pushes the legal
requirement closer to the standard end of the continuum as it
becomes increasingly difficult to know ex ante which of the
various competing “rules” to apply.
2. The Pressure for Justice in the Individual Case. As a
requirement becomes more rule-like, it becomes increasingly
likely that a human decision-maker will seek to evade the
requirement to avoid an outcome the decision-maker believes to
be unjust. The possibility that this will happen creates some
(though perhaps a low) level of uncertainty. Once a given rule
has been evaded on multiple occasions, however, future primary
actors face a situation increasingly similar to one with multiple,
conflicting rules.134
B. Adding Complexity
1. To Rules. Up to a point, adding complexity to rules can
increase legal certainty by specifying predetermined outcomes in
a greater range of fact situations. But adding complexity to rules
reduces legal certainty in at least two situations.135
First, it reduces legal certainty to the extent a
decision-maker lacks the capacity to understand the more
complex rule (either in terms of mental capacity, resources, or
time available).136 For a system of rules, complexity begins to
decrease certainty when the rule-based system becomes so
complex that it is difficult for a decision-maker to determine how
rules interact to govern the primary actor’s conduct. This effect is
133.
This is the case because rules license decision-makers to reach decisions that do
not require any justification beyond—“this is the rule that applies.” The determinism of
rules is not problematic, from a rule of law perspective, when a single rule governs the
situation at issue. However, it is problematic when decision-makers are faced with two
similarly authoritative rules that, if applied, generate conflicting outcomes.
134.
See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 986 (“[O]nce it is decided that a single exception
will be allowed, it is always open, in principle, to decide that another exception should be
made too.”).
135.
Of course, when a rule or rule system is not yet overly complex, adding
complexity can increase certainty—up to a point.
136.
Legal requirements are frequently applied not by the stereotypical federal judge
assisted by law clerks, but by busy bureaucrats (who may not have any formal legal
training) or overworked state trial judges (who may have a caseload so heavy that they
are rarely able to conduct any legal research before ruling on an issue).
On the idea that increasingly detailed legal requirements can reduce, rather
than increase, certainty, see Endicott, supra note 13, at 383; Schuck, supra note 34, at 12,
18–19; Stevenson, supra note 34, at 1160. In speaking about the legal system generally,
Harry Wellington observed: “In our system the law is much too complex to be very clear
even to specialists, and almost surely must remain so.” WELLINGTON, supra note 101, at 6.
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similar to a situation involving multiple, conflicting rules, but is
caused by complexity within one requirement rather than
complexity across multiple, related requirements.
Second, complexity reduces legal certainty to the extent that
a decision-maker determines it is not worth the trouble to
understand the rule’s complexity. The difference here is that the
reduced certainty comes not from limits on the decision-maker’s
capacity,
but
from
the
decision-maker’s
cost-benefit
calculation.137
In either case, the certainty of the legal requirement is
reduced to the degree that the choice between two or more legal
requirements (leading to different outcomes) is underdetermined.
For example, there is relatively little uncertainty about the
technical meaning of a simple rule such as “[speed] limit of 55
miles per hour.”138 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the U.S.
tax code is a notoriously complex system primarily composed of
purportedly certain rules.139 Despite seeking to specify outcomes
in advance, the various statutes, regulations, and interpretive
documents can make it difficult for a decision-maker to
determine the precise tax implications of an individual
transaction or event. In other words, decision-makers applying
simple rules will be less error-prone than those applying complex
ones.140
2. To Standards. As with rules, adding complexity to
standards can increase certainty up to a point. For standards, the
type of complexity that is likely to decrease their certainty is the
presence of a large number of distinct factors that must be
considered in the analysis. As the effect of complexity varies for
different actors, this number will vary from situation to

137.
See Kaplow, supra note 34, at 151, 161.
138.
Note that uncertainty about the technical meaning of a legal requirement is
different from uncertainty about whether a technical violation (say, driving 56, 60, or 65
mph rather than 55 mph) will be enforced. On the possibility that legal requirements may
at times be intended to force compliance with a standard lower than that actually set out
in the rule itself (such as a 55 mph speed limit enforced only when drivers exceed it by 20
mph), see Michael D. Gilbert, Insincere Rules, 101 VA. L. REV. 2185, 2193 (2015). For a
suggestion that a speed limit sign is a “rather misleading advertisement” of the content of
the law, see Tullock, supra note 13, at 206.
139.
Like any system of rules, it has some embedded standards. See Muchmore,
supra note 21, at 178 & n.17 (noting existence of the standard-like economic loss doctrine
in largely rule-based tax law).
140.
See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY,
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 31 (2001) (citing the tax code as an example of a
situation where “the presence of a lot of specific rules . . . create[s] indeterminacy about
what ought to be done even if the individual rules are quite specific”).
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situation.141 However, it seems likely that moving from one factor
to two or three factors will at times increase legal certainty.
Conversely, moving from two-to-three factors to ten-to-twelve
factors will often decrease legal certainty.142
Once multiple factors are relevant, the decision-maker is
faced with a situation that presents some (but not all) of the
same problems as a situation involving multiple inconsistent
rules. This is not because it is impossible to know in advance
what the decision-maker will do—that is also true (at least in
borderline cases) with simple standards. It is instead because the
presence of multiple factors allows the decision-maker to choose
which of the multiple factors to privilege in the balancing
process. This results in a range of realistically possible outcomes
that is likely larger than would be present with a single-factor
standard.143
Classic examples of legal requirements that at least verbally
are structured as simple standards include: the various
“reasonable person” and “reasonableness” tests;144 the “clear and

141.
See supra Part II.C.
142.
This may derive in part from basic limits on human capacity to process
information. The classic article is George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or
Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV.
81 (1956), reprinted in 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 348 (1994) (suggesting that humans can
typically identify around seven different magnitudes of any “unidimensional stimulus
variable”). For a discussion of the significance of Miller’s observations for legal
decision-making, see CLERMONT, supra note 100, at 62–66.
143.
William Eskridge has made a similar point with respect to legislative history,
which “opens up the judicial mind to possibilities that might not have occurred to the
judge.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM
L. REV. 531, 562 (2013) (book review). Eskridge refers to this as the “hermeneutical value
of legislative history.” Id. (emphasis omitted). This is also related to the literature
questioning Ronald Dworkin’s chain-novel theory of judicial precedent. Compare Dworkin,
supra note 61, at 228–38 (setting out chain-novel theory that judicial discretion decreases
as precedent increases), with Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156,
1204 (2005) (concluding, based on empirical analysis of civil cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that judicial discretion begins high in cases of first impression, decreases up to a point as
precedent accumulates, then begins to increase again—likely because a sufficiently large
number of precedents gives judges the ability to pick and choose which of multiple
contradictory precedents to rely on). However, an early-stage working paper by Adam
Samaha suggests that—under certain assumptions—an increase in the number of
available sources reduces, rather than increases, judicial discretion. See Adam Samaha,
Looking over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion? (draft on file
with author).
144.
These tests, of course, are only “simple” standards when they do not include a
sub-test requiring courts to consider or balance specific, additional factors. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 22, at 160 (discussing complexity of case law on “just cause” requirement in
employment law).
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convincing evidence”145 standard in certain civil cases;146 the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in criminal law;147 the
“unconscionability” exception in contract and sales law;148 and
the “unreasonable search”149 prohibition and “probable cause”
requirement in criminal procedure.150
The paradigmatic example of a complex standard is a
multifactor balancing test.151 A balancing test can be either
exhaustive (specifying all factors that can be considered)152 or
non-exhaustive (specifying that factors other than the ones listed
can also be considered).153 The balancing test can specify relative
weights for the individual factors or can allow the decision-maker
to give each factor the weight he or she deems appropriate.
In other words, policy-driven decisions may be more common
when decision-makers are asked to apply complex standards
such as non-exhaustive, multifactor balancing tests instead of

145.
See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE THIRD
CIRCUIT § 1.11 (Comm’n on Model Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit 2015)
(explaining “[c]lear and convincing evidence”).
146.
I do not include the normal, “preponderance of the evidence” requirement in
civil cases here because that requirement is quite certain in the abstract. It requires a
judge or jury to find in favor of a plaintiff so long there is ever-so-slightly more than a 50%
probability favoring the plaintiff. See, e.g., id. § 1.10 (explaining preponderance of the
evidence). This is still a standard rather than a rule, as it operates ex post rather than ex
ante. However, the uncertainty here is not “legal uncertainty,” as the legal requirement is
precise. It is, instead, uncertainty about the application of law to fact. See infra Part III.C.
By contrast, both “clear and convincing evidence” and “beyond a reasonable doubt” are
legally uncertain, as they are deliberately structured to avoid providing a precise quantity
or percentage likelihood that a decision-maker must calculate.
On the possibility that some amount of legal uncertainty remains even in the
preponderance of the evidence standard, see CLERMONT, supra note 100, at 210–11,
275–78.
147.
See, e.g., MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT § 3.06 (Comm’n on Model Civil Jury Instructions Within the Third Circuit
2015) (explaining proof beyond a reasonable doubt). On the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
148.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) (providing that a
court can refuse to enforce all or part of a contract on the ground of unconscionability); see
also U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (explaining unconscionability test).
149.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
150.
Id.
151.
See Muchmore, supra note 21.
152.
See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 964 (using as an example the Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, which mandated that the agency “provide for” nine
diverse factors “to the maximum extent practicable” and “added that each of the nine
factors is equally important” (citing Act of Nov. 27, 1973, § 4(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87
Stat. 627, 629–30)).
153.
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 US 579, 593 (1993)
(prominently explicating four or five factors for evaluating the admissibility of scientific
evidence but noting that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume
to set out a definitive checklist or test”).
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simple, single-factor standards. Similarly, from a behavioral
economic perspective, something similar to the availability
heuristic might make it more likely that a decision-maker would
rely on a particular, otherwise-unlikely factor when it is listed in
a multifactor test than if the decision-maker is presented with a
straightforward single-factor test.154
For example, the basic torts choice-of-law provision of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws directs courts to apply
the law of the state that has “the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties” with respect to the particular
issue in question.155 In making that determination, courts are to
consider four physical locations, “evaluat[ing] [them] according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue”:
the “place where the injury occurred,” “the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred,” “the domicil[e], residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties,” and “the place where the relationship, if any, between
the parties is centered.”156 This works well if all four factors point
to the same state—but if that is the case, the court does not have
a conflict-of-laws problem and simply applies the law of the only
relevant state. When the different factors point in different
directions, the Restatement may legitimize greater reliance on
one of these factors than courts might have been willing to use
had the requirement simply been to apply the law of the place
with the “most significant relationship” to the case as a whole.157
Of course, the point at which additional complexity begins to
decrease certainty is an empirical question. Barton Beebe has

154.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the availability heuristic (which is
generally taken as the tendency to consider memorable or emotionally salient outcomes to
be more likely than they in fact are) is directly applicable here. For a classic work on the
availability heuristic, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 163–65 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
155.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
156.
Id. § 145(2).
157.
It isn’t even this simple. Section 145(1) doesn’t just point to “the most significant
relationship” to the case as a whole. It directs court to look to “the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.” Id.
§ 145(1). The occurrence (territory) and the parties (nationality/residence/domicile) are
two diametrically opposed bases on which conflict-of-law regimes can be based. See LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS § 1.13 (1995).
Moreover, section 6 is an even broader multifactor balancing test, including factors such
as “the needs of the interstate and international systems” and “the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 6(2)(a), (e). Finally, it is not at all clear whether one begins by applying section 145 and
then moves to section 6, or vice-versa (beginning with section 6 and moving to section
145).
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done pioneering empirical analysis of the way judges actually
apply two doctrinally important multifactor tests in intellectual
property law: the test for trademark infringement and the test
for copyright fair use.158
Beebe’s trademark infringement results suggest that judges
applying multifactor tests tend to rely on “a limited number of
core factors” to determine the outcome of complex multifactor
tests.159 In doing so, they appear to employ a “core attributes
heuristic,” which leads them to “stop acquiring and analyzing
information once the last in their set of most important,
determinant attributes has been acquired and analyzed.”160 Once
judges have determined the test outcome based on these core
factors, they tend to “stampede”161 the other factors to
“subsequently fall in line to support that outcome.”162
Beebe’s copyright fair use results suggest that conventional
academic and judicial perceptions may be poor predictors of how
particular multifactor tests operate in practice.163 In particular,
on-the-ground application of multifactor tests may diverge
substantially from what is suggested by a review of traditional
“leading cases” in the field.164
Overall, adding complexity to standards does the same thing
it does for rules. Up to a point, complexity increases legal
certainty; past that point, it decreases legal certainty.
Thus, there are limits on how much legal certainty can be
increased by either making a requirement more rule-like or
making a requirement more complex. At some point, further
movement in these directions can decrease, rather than increase,
legal certainty.
158.
The first is the multifactor test for likelihood of confusion in trademark law.
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, Trademark Infringement]. The second is
the multifactor test for fair use in copyright law. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 549 (2008)
[hereinafter Beebe, Copyright Fair Use].
159.
Beebe, Trademark Infringement, supra note 158, at 1600.
160.
Id. at 1602.
161.
Id. at 1600.
162.
Id. at 1615.
163.
Beebe, Copyright Fair Use, supra note 158, at 552–54. Beebe’s results also
suggest an additional layer of complexity for multifactor tests. To the extent conventional
perceptions do not reliably predict how multifactor tests operate in practice, empirical
analysis beyond the capabilities of most practicing lawyers may be necessary to determine
the effective content of the law. In other words, even if some multifactor tests turn on a
relatively small number of core factors, the fact that empirical analysis is required to
identify those core factors itself increases the complexity of the relevant legal
requirement.
164.
Id. at 555.
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V. THE ROLE OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY IN REGULATORY DESIGN
Up to now, the Article has focused on establishing two
primary points. First, legal uncertainty is a smaller practical
problem than it is often thought to be because it is dwarfed by
other types of uncertainty. Second, interaction between legal
certainty and legal complexity limits the amount of legal
certainty that can be achieved.
The framework developed to establish those primary points
suggests further possibilities for analyzing the role of legal
uncertainty in regulatory design. This Part will advance four
tentative propositions for further research.165 A thorough
examination of each of them is beyond the scope of this Article,
but they suggest the value of a solid analytical framework for
analyzing the role of uncertainty in regulatory design.
The four propositions are: (1) pockets of legal uncertainty are
often a desirable characteristic of regulatory systems; (2) large
swings over time between high levels of certainty and
uncertainty are less desirable than a consistent, moderate level
of legal uncertainty; (3) arguments for legal certainty are rarely
distributionally neutral and are often window dressing for what
are fundamentally distributional arguments; and (4) uncertainty
about the content of future legal requirements is qualitatively
different from uncertainty about the application of existing legal
requirements.
A. Pockets of Legal Uncertainty
The first proposition is that pockets of uncertainty are
desirable in many, and perhaps most, regulatory systems. There
are several reasons for this. There are times when a seemingly
uncertain legal requirement may in fact be more certain in
practice than a seemingly precise one.166 Requirements setting a
precise limit on socially undesirable behavior can encourage
primary actors to come as close to that limit as possible.167 And,
165.
To which the Author of this Article hopes to contribute soon.
166.
See, e.g., Rose, supra note 21, at 609 (“At least in some instances, there is a
great deal more clarity and certainty about a mud rule than a crystal one. This view is
reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code, where a muddy term like ‘commercial
reasonableness’ is regarded as a standard that is more predictable to business people than
such arcana as the mailbox rule of offer and acceptance.” (footnote omitted)).
167.
See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 9, at 179–80; see also Kennedy, supra
note 21, at 1695–96 (“Rules, on the other hand, allow the proverbial ‘bad man’ to ‘walk the
line,’ that is, to take conscious advantage of under-inclusion to perpetrate fraud with
impunity.”). However, this can also cut the other direction, especially if the regulatory
goal is an optimal level of the behavior rather than a minimal politically achievable level.
Uncertain legal requirements can in some circumstances encourage either under- or
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as described above, efforts to eliminate uncertainty by adding
additional specificity can simply result in complex, uncertain
requirements.168
Together,
this
means
that
promulgating
certain
requirements in all circumstances would result in a deadweight
social loss. It is easy to see why this can happen. Promulgating a
legal requirement, whether by the Legislative, Executive, or
Judicial Branch, consumes resources that will not be usable
elsewhere.169 Those involved in developing regulatory systems
have limited factual information about the present and even
more limited factual information about the future. Simple
requirements may require less effort than complex requirements,
but they will nearly always be over- or under-inclusive.170 More
complex requirements may be less over- or under-inclusive, but
will require a correspondingly larger investment of resources to
develop.
Even with a substantial investment of resources, regulators
will still have limited factual information about relevant current
and future states of the world. It is highly unlikely that they will
be able to anticipate all future situations to which the regulatory
system they are developing will be applied. Without this
predictive ability, it may be wasteful to invest the resources
necessary to develop a system of certain, ex ante rules.
Instead, those involved in regulation should seek to
determine which aspects of the regulatory system should be
governed by certain legal requirements and which aspects should
be governed by uncertain requirements. Once the appropriate
locations for uncertainty have been identified, regulators should
focus on the manner in which the legal requirement is
structured171 and the individual or entity to whom the duty to
interpret and apply the uncertain requirement is delegated.172

over-compliance. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984).
168.
See supra Part IV.B.
169.
See generally Kaplow, supra note 21.
170.
See, e.g., SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 31–34, 50; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 990.
171.
See supra Part IV (discussing simple rules, complex rules, simple standards,
and complex standards).
172.
On the incentive structures involved in decisions to delegate authority, see
generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORHAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999). For an
analysis of potential problems involved in delegating enforcement authority in a specific
field (imported-food safety), see Muchmore, supra note 3, at 397–416.
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B. Taming the Certainty-Uncertainty Cycle
The second proposition is that large swings over time
between high levels of certainty and uncertainty are less
desirable than a consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty.
Many legal theorists have detected a cycle between rules and
standards, rigidity and flexibility.173 This is itself a source of legal
uncertainty, either because the content of legal requirements are
changed repeatedly, or because legal requirements are repeatedly
reinterpreted to meet the mood of the time.174 Careful attention
to where legal uncertainty exists in a particular regulatory
scheme can help minimize the frequency and severity of these
swings. Moderate levels of legal uncertainty, placed
appropriately, can perhaps contribute to overall stability and
predictability.
C. Disguised Distributional Arguments
The third proposition is that arguments for legal certainty
are rarely distributionally neutral and are often window dressing
for what are fundamentally distributional arguments.175 Once
baselines are taken into account, arguments for legal certainty
are rarely distributionally neutral.176 Pareto superior changes are
rare; replacing an uncertain legal requirement with a certain
legal requirement ordinarily will harm at least one person or
group.177 This group consists of those who would have benefited
from the decision-maker’s discretion under the existing standard,
but do not qualify for similar beneficial treatment under the new,
more certain legal requirement. Similarly, it will benefit at least
one group—those who would not have benefited from the
decision-maker’s discretion under the existing standard, but who
will benefit from the arbitrary cutoff inherent in a certain legal
requirement.
Additionally, lawyers, regulatory compliance specialists,
accountants, and everyone else who earns money providing
advice on compliance with legal requirements will feel

173.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
174.
On changes in law to meet the overall mood of the time, see GILMORE, supra
note 94, at 68–70.
175.
I develop this point further in a separate paper focused on the regulation of civil
litigation.
176.
On the concept of baselines, see generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 198–206 (2007).
177.
Unless it is truly a Pareto superior change, which is highly unlikely in the real
world. And, of course, the converse is also true—replacing a certain legal requirement
with an uncertain legal requirement will necessarily harm at least one person or group.
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distributional effects from increases or decreases in legal
certainty. However, at least a portion of those distributional
effects is unrelated to the distributional impact created by the
substantive law itself. Generally speaking, these professionals
will be harmed by increases in the simplicity of legal
requirements and will benefit from increases in their
complexity.178
This suggests that regulatory designers179 should be
skeptical of those who claim that there is a need for certainty in a
particular legal requirement.180 It is likely that there are many
areas of law where more certain legal requirements would
increase overall social welfare. Many proposals to increase legal
certainty will be Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and some may even
approach Pareto superiority.181 But other proposals to increase
certainty are likely to reduce overall social welfare by directing
resources to a small group of distributional winners. Moreover, it
is likely that arguments for increased certainty will be made
least forcefully in situations where the benefits of certainty are
broadly dispersed. This is because lobbying182 for legal certainty
is not costless, and in situations with widely dispersed
certainty-related benefits, the individual or entity incurring the
lobbying costs only captures a small portion of the benefits.183
Instead, an individual or entity investing resources to lobby for
certainty is likely to structure the proposed legal requirement in
such a way that it has at least sufficient distributional benefits to
cover the related lobbying costs.
Distributional decisions can be implemented through rules
or standards and can involve simple or complex requirements.
The degree to which the relevant legal requirements are certain
will influence primary behavior, but often to a lesser degree than
178.
Cf. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 21, at 270–71; Wade, supra note 9, at 194
(noting that, in places where law was “predetermined and exactly predictable . . . there
would be no lawsuits, and consequently . . . no lawyers”).
179.
On the “structural differences” between the perspectives on rules of those who
impose rules and those who are subject to them, see Frederick Schauer, Imposing Rules,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 85, 85–86 (2005).
180.
On the possibility that those seeking a regulatory change are often seeking a
redistribution of public resources toward themselves, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4 (1971).
181.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 1.2 (8th
ed. 2011) (explaining Pareto superiority).
182.
In this context, “lobbying” denotes any effort to influence the content of a legal
requirement. This could include academic articles, public relations efforts, and other
activities that would not formally qualify as lobbying under U.S. federal or state law.
183.
On industry’s tendency to lobby primarily for regulatory changes with
concentrated (rather than widely dispersed) distributional benefits, see Stigler, supra
note 180, at 4–5.
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their distributional implications. For example, consider two
classic distributional issues in tort law. One is phrased in the
form of rules, the other mostly in the form of standards.
Let’s start with standard-like requirements. A choice
between negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct as a
basis for liability is a decision among legal requirements
structured as standards. But the standard chosen carries major
distributional consequences for potential tortfeasors and
potential tort victims. Of the three standards of care, a willful
misconduct standard imposes the lowest costs on potential
tortfeasors. In turn, a gross negligence standard imposes fewer
costs on potential tortfeasors than a negligence standard. This is
the case even though all are structured as standard-like
requirements rather than rule-like requirements.184 And
potential tortfeasors will care far more about the level of care
they are required to exercise than about whether it is structured
as a rule or a standard.185
Of course, I have left off an important alternative to
negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct—strict
liability. Strict liability, however, is a rule rather than a
standard, at least at the liability phase.186 But its rule-like
nature is not why a primary actor might prefer it over the other
three standards. What is important to most primary actors is the
distributional decision strict liability entails. Strict liability is
more favorable to potential victims (and less favorable to
potential tortfeasors) than each of the other three standards of
care.187
Now consider a choice between two rule-like requirements of
tort law with major distributional consequences: contributory
and comparative negligence. Both are rule-like in their classic

184.
Willful misconduct is probably more rule-like than negligence or gross
negligence, especially if one adopts an objective (rather than subjective) approach to
willfulness. But, since it is an intent requirement and we do not currently have ways of
precisely measuring an individual’s intent, it still seems closer to the standard end than
the rule end of the rule-standard continuum.
185.
At least if they are sufficiently sophisticated or acting at a large enough scale to
consider the risk of lawsuits in making decisions about the standard of care to exercise,
how much insurance to purchase, or how much to set aside as self-insurance.
186.
It is likely more standard-like at the damages phase, but that should not affect
this analysis.
187.
Assuming, of course, that the damages a tortfeasor must pay for any accident
are equal among the three models. In real life, the political bargain is often different.
Potential tortfeasors at times agree to support a compromise—such as that involved in
workers compensation schemes—that substitute strict liability for negligence, but in turn
provide for a lower level of damages than were available under the previous negligence
regime.
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form. Under a contributory negligence regime, a tort victim
cannot recover anything if his or her own negligence contributed
in any way to the injury.188 Under a comparative negligence
regime, a tort victim’s recovery is reduced by the degree to which
his or her own negligence contributed to the injury.189 Both are
equally rule-like, and it is possible to imagine various rule-like
alternatives in between the two.190 Again, a primary actor’s
preferences between these two regimes will be based on their
distributional consequences, not on the (roughly equal) level of
legal certainty they display.
D. Present and Future Legal Requirements
The fourth proposition is that uncertainty about the content
of future legal requirements is qualitatively different from
uncertainty about the application of existing legal requirements.
Predicting outcomes under an existing legal requirement
may involve some degree of uncertainty, in the general sense
that the term is used in this Article. However, it is a process that
comes closer to Frank Knight’s concept of quantifiable Knightian
Risk rather than non-quantifiable Knightian Uncertainty.191 It is
also a fundamental part of what lawyers are trained to do—Karl
Llewellyn called it the lawyer’s “hunching-power.”192 Generally
speaking, predicting outcomes under current legal requirements
involves choosing among a fairly limited range results reasonably
possible under current law.193
188.
In other words, if the injury is 20% the fault of the victim, and 80% the fault of
the tortfeasor, the victim recovers nothing.
189.
In other words, if the injury is 20% the fault of the victim, and 80% the fault of
the tortfeasor, the victim recovers 80% of his or her damages.
190.
For example, one could provide that the victim recovers nothing if the injury is
more than 50% due to the victim’s negligence, but recovers proportionally if the victim’s
negligence contributed less than 50% to the injury. And this of course suggests
additional—and perhaps increasingly complex—rule-like variations.
191.
For Frank Knight’s concepts of “risk” and “uncertainty,” see supra note 1. In
other words, with existing law (and existing legal institutions) as a background,
experienced lawyers are often able to give a rough numerical estimate of the likely case
outcome.
192.
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 113 (1930) (exhorting law
students to “school[] . . . your hunching-power as to the outcome of a case, as to the way a
court will jump”); see also id. (“Your client pays you to hunch right. Of course, he pays you
too, if you hunch wrong. Once.”).
193.
The degree of certainty involved in a standard-like legal requirement depends
on the identity of the individual (or groups of individuals) to whom application of the
standard is delegated. To the extent decision-makers share similar backgrounds and
policy views (and are insulated from corrupting influences), the range of likely outcomes
is relatively limited. In such a situation, the outcome in a particular fact situation may be
fairly predictable even when the legal requirement is uncertain. (The converse also
applies.)
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Predicting the content of future legal requirements of course
involves some quantifiable Knightian Risk. But it also involves a
far greater degree of Knightian Uncertainty than predicting
outcomes under existing requirements. Thinking purely in terms
of formal law, the content of future legal requirements turns on
election results, the life span of particular office holders, and the
bargaining that takes place among different public and private
actors. And each of these depends on all of the events that take
place in the world—from the discovery of DNA to the
development of atomic weaponry to the capture of an individual
terrorist. These inputs into the law-making process are things
that lawyers and their clients are poorly equipped to predict in
anything beyond the very short term. They are perhaps closer to
the expertise of political scientists, macro-economists, and
cutting-edge scientists—but none of these groups have proved
particularly successful in long-term prediction either.
Uncertainty about future legal requirements impacts
long-range planning by both public and private entities. And
uncertainty about future law is more problematic, in terms of
long-range planning, than uncertainty about present law. This is
more so when the uncertainty is about—as it often is—the
distributional decisions that the future law will make.
This Part has set out four tentative propositions about the
role of legal uncertainty in regulatory design. Those four
propositions are reviewed at the end of the concluding Part
below.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the role of legal uncertainty in
regulatory design. First, it highlighted the relationship between
legal uncertainty, factual uncertainty, and law-fact uncertainty.
It demonstrated that factual uncertainty and law-fact
uncertainty play a major role in the decision-making of primary
actors. Accordingly, even complete legal certainty cannot come
close to eliminating the uncertainty faced by primary actors in
their interactions with the law.
Second, the Article focused on legal uncertainty, viewing it
from two perspectives: legal form (the range from rules to
standards) and legal complexity (the range from simple to
complex). It demonstrated that there are limits to the degree of
legal certainty that can be obtained by making legal
requirements either more rule-like or more complex. These are
limits of internal consistency; the pressure for justice in the
individual case, and the tendency of additional complexity—past
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a certain point—decrease, rather than increase, the certainty of
legal requirements.
Third, the Article set out four propositions, for further
research, arising out of the framework developed here:
(1) pockets of legal uncertainty are often a desirable
characteristic in regulatory systems; (2) large swings over time
between high levels of certainty and uncertainty are less
desirable than a consistent, moderate level of legal uncertainty;
(3) arguments for legal certainty are often disguised
distributional arguments; and (4) uncertainty about the content
of future legal requirements is qualitatively different from
uncertainty about the application of existing legal requirements.

